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In the area of criminal procedure in recent years,
the Terms of the United States Supreme Court,
like the month of March, have "come in like a lion
and gone out like a lamb." Each Term begins with
the legal-affairs editors of major news services tell-
ing us that this will be the Term in which the
Court will overrule Miranda' or, at the other ex-
treme, in which the Court will extend the exclu-
sionary rule to encounters between crossing guards
and school children. But when the Term is con-
cluded we find that nothing monumental has hap-
pened. Members of the bench and bar compla-
cently ask about the rule changes for this season's
encounters, while those of us in academe search for
important, if unreal, implications of cases to write
about.
The past Term was no exception; the subject
matter of the cases and most of the outcomes were
predictable. The Term included the seemingly
obligatory six to ten opinions on the fourth amend-
ment,2 a few decisions refusing to extend Miranda
safeguards to any situation not directly covered by
a Supreme Court decision made prior to the begin-
ning of this decade,3 and a case restricting the right
* Professor of Law. University of Illinois College of
I.aw. The author wishes to thank Ms. Charlene Quigley
and Ms. Roberta Shallenberger, third-year students at
the coliege, for their research work and editorial assist-
ance in connection with this article.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).2 See Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979); United
States v. Caceres, 99 S. Ct. 1465 (1979); Dalia v. United
States, 99 S. Ct. 1682 (1979); Dunaway v. New York, 99
S. Ct. 2248 (1979); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 99 S. Ct. 2425
'1979); Smith v. Maryland, 99 S. Ct. 2577 (1979); Ar-
kansas-v. Sanders, 99 S. Ct. 2586 (1979); Brown v. Texas,
99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979); Michigan v. DeFillippo, 99 S. Ct.
2627 (1979): Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
'See North Carolina v. Butler, 99 S. Ct. 1755 (1979);
Fare v. Michael C., 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979). The Court did
prohibit any use of testimonial evidence gained from a
defendant at a grand jury proceeding when the defendant
had been granted immunity at the grand jury. See New
Jersey v. Portash. 4-t0 U.S. 450 (1979).
to counsel.4 Typically, there is a spattering of de-
cisions on a variety of procedural topics, with no
more than two cases on any topic apart from the
"big three" of fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment
issues. This Term the Court gave us a series of
rulings regarding the use of codefendants' state-
ments at trials,5 the permissibility of granting lower
sentences for guilty pleas,6 and the number of
jurors that must agree on a verdict.7 There also
were cases involving traditional winners and losers:
the Court remained true to the constitutional prin-
ciple that racially discriminatory practices in the
selection of jurors or grand jurors will invalidate a
conviction 8 and equally true to its own working
principle that the press always loses in criminal
procedure cases.
9
If there was something unusual about this Term
it was that the Supreme Court focuse-, more on
During this decade the Supreme Court has not found
that any item of testimonial evidence should be excluded
from evidence solely on the basis of Miranda, thus effec-
tively limiting Miranda to the picture -'no warning" prob-
lem examined by the Warren Court. See Stone, The
Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sop. CT. REV. 99,
100-01. During this Term the Justices were evenly di-
vided on the issue of whether evidence gained as the
result of a Miranda violation could serve as a basis for
establishing probable cause for a search. Massachusetts
v. White, 439 U.S. 280 (1979) (per curiam).
4 See Scott v. Illinois. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
r' Parker v. Randolph, 99 S. Ct. 2132 (1979).
6 Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212 (19/8). The
problem has arisen in a variety of settings in the past
dozen years. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S.
357 (1978); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
7 Burch v. Louisiana, 99 S. Ct. 1623 (1979) (six-person
jury must be unanimous).
i Rose v. Mitchell, 99 S. Ct. 2993 (1979).
9 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898
(1979)(press barred from pretrial proceedings). See also
Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (plurality
decision)(no press right of access to prison facilities);
Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978)(no first
amendment barrier to warranted searches of press of-
fices); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972)(rejecting
reporter's assertion of privilege from grand jury question-
ing).
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due process than it has in the past several terms.
The Court found that due process gave virtually
no protection to prisoners being considered for
parole' o and imposed practically no limits on the
conditions of prison facilities." However, the Jus-
tices did struggle with problems of sufficiency of
evidence in a criminal trial and the use of pre-
sumptions at trial.12 In related decisions the Court
also found that the reasonable doubt standard did
not apply to the involuntary commitment of adults
to mental institutions 3 and that parents could
have their children locked away in such institutions
without any precommitment adversary process. 4
If recent Terms are not notable for what the
Court did, the opinions of the Court in those years
are notable for what the Court did not do. During
the late 1970's the Supreme Court abandoned any
attempt to identify fundamental values in its de-
cisions concerning Bill of Rights issues, as the
Justices shifted from a due process methodology to
a formalistic interpretation of the Bill of Rights. In
its due process decisions the Court showed some, if
not great, concern with value definition and the
principle of fairness, a concern which is missing in
its Bill of Rights decisions. In short, it appears that
incorporation has hindered the development of
constitutional principles regarding the criminal
process. My point is not that incorporation was ill
conceived, initially doomed to failure, or due to be
reversed, but only that the Supreme Court should
employ a new form of due process methodology in
resolving Bill of Rights, as well as due process,
issues. I will take a brief look at due process meth-
odology and at a sampling of recent cases to deter-
mine whether a due process methodology might
improve the Court's decisionmaking and opinions
on fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment issues. I will
not explore all possible Bill of Rights issues, nor
will I attempt an exhaustive treatment of Supreme
Court decisions during the 1970's. It is hoped that
the reader will develop his or her own framework
for a due process analysis and use that to evaluate
other issues and cases.
Before the Court began incorporating the Bill of
Rights criminal procedure provisions into the four-
' Greenholtz v. Inmates of tne. Neb. Penal & Correc-
tional Complex, 99 S. Ct. 2100 (1979).
" Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979).
12See Sandstrom v. Montana, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979);
County Court v. Allen, 99 S. Ct. 2213 (1979).
. Addington v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979).
'4 Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979): Secretary of
Pub. Welfare v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 99 S. Ct. 2523
(1979).
teenth amendment, it appeared that the Court
would develop a set of due process principles ca-
pable of resolving difficult procedural issues in our
criminal justice system. Fifty years ago the Su-
preme Court turned its attention to the question of
fairness in the criminal process. 5 From 1930 to
1955 the Court explored questions of due process
as well as the meaning of the provisions of the Bill
of Rights which applied to the federal criminal
process and the meaning of the due process clauses
in relation to the state and federal systems.'
6
'5The federal courts, including the Supreme Court,
did not issue any significant rulings regarding constitu-
tional restraints on federal criminal prosecutions until
this century, and there was no serious inquiry into the
fairness of state proceedings until the 1930's. See Schaefer,
Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L. REv. I,
2-4 (1956).
'"The Court had incorporated the basic principles of
the fourth and eighth amendments into the concept of
liberty prior to the 1960's, but it did not settle the
question of whether those principles applied to the states
in the same manner as to the federal government. See
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)(fourth amendment,
but not exclusionary rule, applicable to the states); Louis-
iana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (cruel
and unusual punishment clause applied to states). The
Court had incorporated the promise of the first amend-
ment to the states prior to the 1950's. See J. NOWAK, R.
RoT'rNDA & J. YOUNc, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 414-15
(1978). The modern process of incorporation of the crim-
inal procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights began with
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)(fourth amendment
exclusionary rule applies to states) and Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963)(fourth amendment standards identi-
cal for federal and state cases).
In the 1960's and early 1970's the Court incorporated
all of the Bill of Rights provisions related to criminal
procedure except for the grand jury clause of the fifth
amendment, whose incorporation has been rejected since
1884. See HIurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
A basic list of the other incorporation cases is as
follows:
Fifth Amendment-Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436
(1970) (collateral estoppel); Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S.
784 (1969)(double jeopardy); Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965)(self-incrimination); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. I (1964)(self-incrimination).
Sirth Amendment-Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968)(jury trial); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14
(1967)(compulsory process); Klopfer v. North Carolina
386 U.S. 213 (1967)(speedy trial); Pointer v. Texas, 38(
U.S. 400 (1965)(confrontation); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963)(right to counsel); Irvin v. Dowd, 366
U.S. 717 (1961)(impartial jury); In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257 (1948)(public trial).
Eighth Amendment-Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365
(197 l)(assuming application of excessive bail provision to
state cases); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962)(cruel and unusual punishment clause); Louisiana
ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)(cruel and
unusual punishment clause).
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Judges of other courts and scholars encouraged
the Court to develop a comprehensive theory of
due process. Justice Schaefer of the Illinois Su-
preme Court, in his Holmes lecture of 1956, noted
that the Court had not experienced great difficulty
in its due process decisions because this initial stage
of decisionmaking involved cases that did not pres-
ent serious conflicts of social policies." He antici-
pated conflicts in future cases between local law
enforcement policies and the protection of consti-
tutional values regarding individual dignity and
fairness in the criminal justice system: Justice
Schaefer urged the Supreme Court to adopt a
flexible due process theory that would identify the
fundamental constitutional values, resolve current
conflicts in these social policies, and accommodate
future changes in society.
In 1957 Professor, now Dean, Sanford Kadish
constructed a framework for a due process meth-
odology capable of protecting individual rights
while allowing for the efficient prosecution of
crime.t 8 Dean Kadish demonstrated that a fixed
due process theory was unworkable; no simple
Some Justices believed that even if the Bill of Rights
was applicable to the states there was no need to hold
state laws to the same standards under those amend-
ments. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 808
n.12 (1969)(Harlan, J., dissenting) (citing opinions of
Justice Stewart); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14
(1964) (Harlan,J., dissenting). However, a majority of the
Justices have rejected this concept and held that when a
provision of the Bill of Rights is made applicable to the
states, it applies to state and local acts in the same
manner as it does to federal actions. See, e.g., Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Baldwin v. New-York, 399
U.S. 66 (1970)(plurality decision); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
A recent ruling held that there may be less than unani-
mous jury verdicts in state but not federal trials. This
anomalous decision resulted from a unique division of
votes on the Court and the failure of any position of the
substantive issue to gain a majority vote. Eight Justices
believed that the sixth and fourteenth amendments re-
quired identical rules for state and federal trials, but four
voted for a single standard of uniformity and four voted
to allow nonunanimous verdicts in both systems. The
decision, therefore, rested on the vote of Justice Powell,
the only current member of the Court believing in dual
standards. He voted to allow nonunanimous verdicts in
the state but not the federal case. However, the principle
of a single standard is still followed even though there
were differing results in those cases. See Apodaca v.
Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406
U.S. 356 (1972)(Apodaca and Johnson were decided to-
gether).
'17See Schaefer, supra note 15, at 3-7, 17. See also W.
SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIETY (1966).
"' Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudi-
cation-A Surve.y and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319 (1957).
appeal to historical usage could resolve current
issues and conflicts of values in the criminal process.
A flexible concept of due process was needed so
that the adversary system could adapt to changes
in society. Kadish felt a due process methodology
must insure continued respect for individual dig-
nity and fairness to individual defendants, while
maintaining or improving the reliability of the
guilt-determination process. This goal could not be
achieved merely through incorporating the Bill of
Rights into due process, thereby turning difficult
issues into formally simple ones regarding interpre-
tations of specific provisions of the Bill of Rights.
Dean Kadish noted that those provisions were
limited and that formal reliance on them in diffi-
cult cases would obscure the judicial function of
defining fundamental values in the adversary proc-
ess.
t9 Instead, Dean Kadish advocated the use of a
flexible due process concept, which he described as
a method of rational inquiry designed to identify
values in procedural due process. Using this flexible
methodology, a court considering a defendant's
challenge to a state's investigatory practices, or to
a point of procedure, would define the constitu-
tional values regarding individual dignity or fair-
ness that are brought into question by the claim
and the degree to which a ruling either for or
against the defendant would effect the reliability
of the guilt-determination process or the ability of
the state investigatory and adjudicatory agencies
to identify and prosecute those guilty of crime. The
Court then would determine the extent to which
these societal values conflicted and whether com-
peting values could be accommodated. To resolve
the conflict, or to make the accommodation, the
court openly would determine the value that
should be placed upon a point of individual dignity
or fairness raised by the defendant, including the
practical and philosophical value of the asserted
right, and the effect of the challenged practice on
the reliability of the process.
In the 1960's the Supreme Court turned away
from due process methodology by incorporating
most of the Bill of Rights into the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 2° Earlier in
19 Dean Kadish anticipated the decisions of the 1970's
as he incisively noted that incorporation theory might
facilitate the issuance of restrictive rulings concerning the
rights of defendants by removing the necessity for frank
recognition of the judicial responsibility of interpretation
and allowing for the avoidance of value oriented deci-
sions. Kadish, supra note 18, at 336-38.




the century, the Court based the question of incor-
poration on a due process methodology by asking
which provisions of the Bill of Rights were essential
to the concept of liberty.21 However, in the 1960's
the Court incorporated those provisions of the Bill
of Rights that it found were fundamental to the
American system of justice.2 " The Court not only
incorporated the basic principle of each amend-
ment, it also applied the incorporated provision to
the states in the same way it applied the provision
to the federal government. 23 Justices Frankfurter
and Harlan argued that this process of incorpora-
tion and identical application would not work
because of the differences in the federal and state
systems and because difficult questions of modern
criminal procedure could not be resolved by a
simple appeal to a list of eighteenth century con-
cerns. "4 As the trend of incorporation rulings
emerged, Judge Friendly warned, as had Dean
Kadish, that the attempt to base decisions on the
Bill of Rights would divert attention from the
problem of interpreting fundamental due process
values. judge Friendly also warned that assertion
of an "historic" Bill of Rights basis for a decision,
when none existed, would result in unjustifiable
interference with state criminal proceedings.
25
Although the story of incorporation has been
written, it is worthwhile to analyze the question of
the judicial function and constitutional interpre-
tation as it relates to the process of incorporation.
After 1937 the Court rejected the substantive due
process principles which it used to overturn a va-
riety of social and economic legislation during the
first third of the century. The Court relied upon
the text of the Constitution and its conception of
the fundamental values of our democratic proc-
ess.
26 The Court might have justified its activity by
reference to our historic commitment to fairness in
the adversary process, evidenced by the concern of
the drafters of the Bill of Rights with some specific
21 Palko v. Connecticut. 302 U.S. 319. 325-26 (1937).
2- Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145. 148-49 (1968).
23 See note 16 supra for a listing and overview of these
cases.2aThe only way the difficult questions of modern
criminal procedure could be resolved by a simple appeal
to a list of eighteenth century concerns would be to
consider the list a recognition of fundamental values
which required modern definition and interpretation. See,
e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408 (1965)(liarlan,
J., concurring); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46. 59
(1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
2 Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal
Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. Rr.v. 929 (1965).26 See J. NOWAK, R. ROTuNDA & J. YoUNGu, supra note
16, at -110- 19.
aspects of that process. 27 However, the Court used
incorporation and the text of the Bill of Rights to
justify its function in reviewing criminal legislation,
executive agency practices relating to the investi-
gation and prosecution of crime, and the work of
state and lower federal courts in this area. Those
who argued, as did justice Black,28 that this process
of incorporation would limit the discretion of the
Justices, were mistaken. There is no way to avoid
making interpretative decisions on issues relating
to topics arguably covered by the Bill of Rights
when there is no historic guidance on, nor simple
textual resolution of, the issue. States simply do not
appear in the Supreme Court of the United States
asking for the ability to conduct unreasonable
searches without warrants or probable cause, to
force defendants to incriminate themselves against
their will, to exclude counsel from criminal pro-
ceedings, to eliminate juries in criminal cases, or to
try defendants twice for the same crime. Yet only
such claims could be resolved easily by an appeal
to the Bill of Rights.
When cases raise questions that cannot be re-
solved by a quick reference to the language or
history of the Bill of Rights, the Court must look
elsewhere to justify its decisions. In so doing, the
Supreme Court must justify its ability to define
fundamental values in the governmental and ad-
versary process. A simple appeal to the Bill of
Rights cannot satisfy either defendants or other
members of society who disagree with the Court's
ruling. However, reliance on a specific Bill of
Rights provision might cause the Court to abandon
its attempt to define fundamental values in the
criminal process, regardless of whether this reliance
increased or decreased the rights of the defendant.
In 1964 Professor Francis Allen noted that the
Supreme Court's activity in the area of criminal
procedure was necessary to protect the fundamen-
tal values of fairness and individual dignity and to
spur local legislatures on to improve outdated as-
pects of the local administration of criminal jus-
tice.ss But following the years of Supreme Court
interpretation of the Bill of Rights in criminal
procedure cases, Professor Allen noted that the
Court's rulings were liable to be implemented and
27 See generally Wellington, Common Law Rules and Con-
stitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83
YALE L.J. 221, 265-66. 270-75 (1973).
See. e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 106
(1970)(Black,J.. concurring and dissenting); Adamson v.
California. 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).




honored in the future only if the Court openly
confronted the question ofjustifying its rulings on
the basis of the proper scope of thejudicial function
and definition of fundamental values in our society.
As the Professor incisively noted:
The Warren Court enjoyed its greatest successes
when it advanced solutions that were supported by
a broad ethical consensus, as in cases involving the
right of impoverished defendants to counsel in the
courtroom .... The central problem of the Warren
Court's activism in the criminal area was not that
it threatened serious abuses of power by politically
irresponsible judges. Rather, it was simply that,
despite the Court's ingenious, persistent, and some
may feel, heroic efforts to overcome the inherent
limitations of judicial power, the Court attempted
more than it could possibly achieve.'n
These comments do not attack the Court's at-
tempt to expand the rights of defendants in crim-
inal cases, rather they indicate that narrowing one's
focus to the Bill of Rights can lead to a failure to
view criminal process issues in the proper perspec-
tive of defining the judicial role in that process.
The failure to question the judicial role in assuring
fairness in the criminal process may lead to a
restriction of the rights of the defendant as easily,
and perhaps even more easily, than it may lead to
an expansion of those rights. Use of a due process
approach would require the Supreme Court in
each case to examine its role in insuring fairness in
the adversary process and in our society's historic
commitment to the values involved in that process.
Often these issues will involve specific provisions of
the Bill of Rights; but if those provisions are not
interpreted with due process methodology, then
the Court will fail to consider the concept of fair-
ness in its decision.
2
'
Allen, FheJudicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren
Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 540.
Professor Allen's concern with the identification of fun-
damental values in the criminal process is reflected
throughout his writings. See, e.g., Allen, The Lau, as a Path
to the llorld, 77 Micr. L. REV. 157(1978); Allen, Criminal
Law and the hIodern Consciousness: Some Observations on
Blameworthiness, 44 TENN. L. REV. 735 (1977); Allen,
Rights in Conflict: A Balanced Approach, 3 VAL. U.L. REV.
223 (1969): Allen, legal 'alues and Correctional Values, 18
U. TORONTO L.J. 119 (1968); Allen, Federalism and the
Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf, 1961 Sup. CT. REV.
I.
31 It is interesting to note that it was Justice Harlan
who dissented from the Supreme Court's ruling that the
appointment of counsel for a defendant shortly before
trial did not violate the defendant's rights. Chambers v.
Maroney. 399 U.S. 42, 55 (1970) (llarlan,.J., concurring
and dissenting).
There should be little doubt that the process of
incorporation benefited those who are confronted
by the investigatory or adjudicatory government
agencies in the criminal process. However, one
must recognize the danger that postincorporation
criminal procedure decisions will assume an arbi-
trary quality if the Court fails to consider its proper
function in analyzing fundamental values in the
criminal process. For that reason one should seek
to identify a due process methodology and then
examine the postincorporation criminal procedure
decisions of the 1970's to determine whether an
attempt should be made to employ a due process
methodology when interpreting the meaning of
specific provisions of the Bill of Rights which have
been incorporated into the due process clause and
applied to the states.
A DUE PROCESS METHODOLOGY
In describing a due process methodology one
cannot be very specific since it is a method of
deciding cases, rather than a specific test for judg-
ing the constitutionality of any particular compo-
nent in a criminal justice system. The method of
decisionmaking that the Court has used in resolv-
ing due process issues both in criminal procedure
cases and in cases concerning deprivations of lib-
erty or property in the civil area should be consid-
ered here. In using a due process methodology for
deciding criminal procedure issues, whether or not
they involve a Bill of Rights issue, the Court should
go through four stages in its analysis and opinion.
This four step process will serve as our "model" of
due process adjudication. First, the Court should
face the question of judicial interpretation openly
and identify the values that are involved in the
case. The opinion should note the precise Bill of
Rights or due process clause issues and the problem
of defining and protecting values when no histori-
cal means exist for arriving at a fixed meaning for
the constitutional provision in question. Second,
the Court should determine the importance of the
values endangered by the state's practice. The
opinion should inquire into either the nature of the
values reflected in the Bill of Rights provision at
issue in the case or the general principles of due
process, i.e., protection of individual dignity, equal-
ity of treatment, and traditional conceptions of
fairness." ' Third, the Court should examine the
ss These principles of due process are developed and
explained in the context of procedural rulings outside the
criminal area in Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process
Calculus fJr Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge:
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impact of a ruling (for or against the defendant)
on the reliability of the guilt-determination process,
and it should evaluate the cost of administering a
system with the procedural safeguard, if any,
sought by the defendant. This portion of the anal-
ysis involves questions of economic and social costs,
including the difficulty of administering a system
of justice with limited resources and expanded
procedures. Fourth, the Court should determine
whether the due process or Bill of Rights values
outweigh the social costs of a ruling adverse to the
state. This entails more than a mere utilitarian
balancing test; it involves explicit reasoning in the
opinion which confronts the question of the extent
to which the state practice endangers fundamental
constitutional values. Further, the Court openly
should examine whether this society's historic and
philosophic commitment to those values requires it
to bear the costs.
While the due process methodology seems diffi-
cult to develop, it is not beyond the capability of
the Supreme Court. In the area of due process
adjudication concerning deprivations of liberty or
property unconnected to criminal procedure, the
Court, in Mathews v. Eldridge,33 specifically adopted
a balancing test that approximates the proposed
due process methodology. When someone whom
the government deprives of life, liberty, or property
disputes the facts or issues upon which the depri-
vation is based, the state must grant the dispos-
sessed individual a fair procedure before an impar-
tial decisionmaker. In determining the exact nature
of the required procedure, the Court stated that it
will consider three factors in deciding which pro-
cedural safeguards, if any, to give the effected
individual. The three factors are:
First, the private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional
or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including the function in-
volved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural require-
ment would entail.34
The balancing test used in the civil area is a
purely utilitarian one which balances accuracy
Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHi. L.
Rvv. 28 (1976). See also Saphire, Specif',ing Due Process
Values: Toward a More Responsive Approach to Procedural
Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REv. I 11 (1978).
'0 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
3'1d. at 335.
considerations against social cost. Professor Mas-
haw convincingly argued that the Court should
use a more value-oriented approach in even the
civil due process area because the utilitarian bal-
ancing process degrades the nature of due process
rights and is not well suited to the judicial func-
tion.ss A purely utilitarian approach to criminal
procedure issues clearly is unacceptable because of
our historic commitment to fairness in the criminal
process. This commitment is reflected in the history
of Supreme Court rulings on due process values in
the criminal area, as well as in its concern for
specific aspects of the process in the Bill of Rights.
Judicial activity can only be justified here by as-
serting a judicial function which identifies funda-
mental constitutional values. Dean Wellington
noted that the Court can justify its constitutional
rulings only in terms of the judicial ability to
define, through a rational process, fundamental
constitutional principles. This is because the other
branches of government are better suited to making
policy determinations based upon utilitarian con-
cerns than is the Court.36 The due process model
herein advocated adds value identification to the
civil due process balancing test. The model requires
the Court to consider this nation's historic and
philosophic commitment to the values endangered
by the allegedly unconstitutional practice. The
model also requires the Court to consider whether
there is a basis for asserting that our society is
committed to protecting that value even if it must
bear a significant social or economic cost.
It is worthwhile to note that the Court has been
relatively successful in using the balancing test to
determine the extent of process one is entitled to
before being deprived of liberty or property. 37 In
Addington v. Texasss the Justices unanimously deter-
mined that an adult cannot be involuntarily com-
mitted to a psychiatric institution unless the state,
in a trial, has met the commitment standard with
"clear and convincing" evidence. Mr. ChiefJustice
Burger's opinion for the Court found that the
societal and constitutional value placed on individ-
ual freedom required a standard of proof beyond
a mere preponderance of the evidence; however,
the nature of the commitment proceedings, which
are nonpunitive and concerned with issues upon
which there cannot be factual certainty, did not
:r See Mashaw, note 32 supra.
36 See Wellington, note 27 supra.
:17 The cases in the area are examined in J. NoWAK, R.
ROTUNDA &J. YOUNC, supra note 16, at 498-514.
38 99 S. Ct. 1804 (1979).
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require the states to adopt a standard of "beyond
a reasonable doubt" or "unequivocal proof." In
Parham v.J.R.39 the Justices unanimously held that
children committed to mental institutions by their
parents were entitled only to an admissions screen-
ing procedure by a "neutral fact finder" to deter-
mine if the criteria for commitment were met in
the individual case.40 Chief Justice Burger em-
ployed the Mathews balancing test to determine
that no formal hearing was required but, in so
doing, the Chief Justice considered the value
placed on individual freedom and the historic rec-
ognition of certain parental and state interest in
the care of minor children.
Although one may disagree with the results in
these cases, the Court's open analysis of the values
at stake in each proceeding and its attempt to
accommodate the competing values of liberty and
efficient administrative procedures certainly is
preferable to the masking of such decisions through
vaguely worded opinions or formalistic interpreta-
tions of constitutional provisions. Indeed, in related
decisions concerning the "extension" of due process
safeguards, the Court avoided the open use of the
due process model with a resultant inadequacy in
the opinions.4 1 For example, in Greenholtz v. Inmates
of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex,42 where
the Court decided that inmates of penal institu-
tions were not entitled to due process protection in
decisionmaking processes related to their possible
release on parole, a majority of the Justices totally
failed to analyze the basic due process question.
The majority in Greenholtz found that there was no
39 99 S. Ct. 2493 (1979). This case was initially misti-
tied Parham v. J.L in the original slip opinion of the
Supreme Court. See 47 U.S.L.W. 4740 (U.S. June 20,
1979) (No. 75-1690).4
' Three Justices dissented from the Court's refusal to
grant additional precommitment safeguards to wards of
the state who were to be committed to these facilities.
Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2515 (1979)(Brennan, J.,
joined by Marshall and Stevens, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). The Court, by the same six-to-
three vote, refused to grant any right to formal postad-
mission procedures to these juveniles, finding only that
the postadmission procedures must be fair and indepen-
dent. 99 S. Ct. at 2506. See also Secretary of Pub. Welfare
v. Institutionalized Juveniles, 99 S. Ct. 2523 (1979).
41 The cases in the area are concerned with the defi-
nition of "life," "liberty," and "property" interests which
are protected by the due process clause. See, e.g., Paul v.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)(reputation of individual is
not protected); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972)(untenured teacher's employment not protected).
The cases are examined in J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YouNo, supra note 16, at 476-97.
42 99 S. Ct. 2100 (1979).
liberty interest meriting protection by the due proc-
ess clause at issue in these proceedings. The four
Justices who dissented, at least in part, found that
the individual prisoners had a liberty interest at
stake in this process. Accordingly, these Justices
struggled openly with the problem of determining
what, if any, procedural safeguards should be given
to those prisoners, 3 while the majority simply as-
serted that it could distinguish cases granting some
procedural safeguards to convicted defendants in
parole or probation revocation proceedings because
those persons had a conditional liberty interest
which the inmate lacked.M Even if one agreed with
the majority's conclusion that few, if any, proce-
dural safeguards should be added to the parole
process, the Supreme Court's decision would be
more acceptable if the majority opinion openly
considered the values of individual liberty and
societal costs involved in the parole system. Thus,
one finds it easier to accept the separate opinion of
Justice Powell, which recognized that inmates had
an interest worthy of protection by the due process
clause and then found that the need of efficiently
processing inmate files outweighed the interest in
freedom preceding the expiration of a properly
imposed criminal sentence. Justice Powell found
that the prison's minimal procedural safeguards,
except its practice of giving prisoners very short
notice of their scheduled parolehearing, comported
with due process standards. Powell's balancing ap-
proach is more satisfying than the majority's simple
assertion that the possibility of parole is no more
than a hope-"a hope which is not protected by
due process."'45 By failing to adopt the Powell
approach it was possible to avoid questions of
fairness and value identification even in due proc-
ess decisions.
Having examined the concept of due process
methodology, it is appropriate to evaluate a sam-
pling of recent Bill of Rights decisions in terms of
our model.
SIXTH AMENDMENT IssuEs
Although the jurisprudence of the sixth amend-
ment is not historically or philosophically uniform
among its clauses, the pattern of sixth amendment
adjudication in the areas of the right to jury trial,
the right to counsel at pretrial identification pro-
4 See 99 S. Ct. at 2111 (Marshall,J.,joined by Brennan
and Stevens, JJ., concurring and dissenting); id. at 2109-
11 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).




ceedings, and the right to appointed counsel at
critical stages in the criminal prosecution demon-
strate the negative effects of the Court's abandon-
ment of a due process methodology during the
1970's.
In the area of right to jury trial, the decade
began with the so called "sixth month-six person"
decisions. While the rule limiting the right to a
jury to cases involving crimes punishable by im-
prisonment for more than six months46 may have
been a necessary limiting definition in an age where
the scope of criminal offenses has expanded far
beyond that which could have been envisioned in
the eighteenth century, Williams v. Florida,4 7 which
allowed the state and federal governments to use
juries of six rather than twelve persons, ultimately
vindicated the Justices who opposed the incorpo-
ration of the Bill of Rights into the concept of due
process. The majority in Williams found that there
was no historical or philosophical reason why the
sixth amendment must be read to require juries of
twelve persons. However, Justice Harlan devas-
tated this argument by citing historical evidence
that the phrase, as understood by Anglo-American
lawyers in the eighteenth century, referred to a
right to a jury of twelve persons.48 Justice Harlan
believed that a due process methodology should
have been used to determine whether a jury of less
than twelve persons was fair for criminal proceed-
ings in the state systems, which had much greater
workloads than did the federal system. Harlan also
thought that the historic meaning of the jury-trial
provision for the federal system should mean that
the federal government could not be allowed to
reduce the size of juries. Although Justice Black,
concurring in the Court's ruling, argued that there
was no deficiency in the incorporation doctrine,
because the Court would have reached the same
result under the due process clause,49 he entirely
missed Justice Harlan's point. The fact that the
Court would have reached the same result regard-
ing the state systems does not mean that it should
have watered down the historic, literal commit-
ment of the federal system to a jury of twelve
persons. Additionally, open use of a due process
methodology would have allowed the Court an
intelligible basis for later decisions concerning una-
nimity among jurors and the precise size of juries.
The failure to use a due process methodology in
4 Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
'-'399 U.S. 78 (1970).48 1d. at 120-21 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result).
49 Id. at 106--14 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting).
these initial jury cases resulted in the Court admit-
ting that it will arbitrarily define the scope of the
right to a jury trial. While it is true that the results
of the cases required the federal government to use
unanimous juries while allowing the states to have
some degree of nonunanimity among jurors, this
result was occasioned by a peculiar split in the
voting of the Justices.* In the past two Terms the
Court found that legislatures cannot reduce juries
below six persons and that six-person juries cannot
render nonunanimous verdicts, but, in so doing,
the Court admitted that it has no principled basis
for making these decisions. In Ballew v. Georgia5' the
Court required the states to use at least six persons
in criminal trial juries, but it so held without
opinion, even though all nine Justices believed that
juries comprised of fewer than six persons were
unconstitutional. For a variety of reasons, six of the
Justices believed that ajury of less than six persons
did not satisfy the sixth amendment's require-
ments, while three Justices believed that a jury of
five members did not guarantee a fair process in a
criminal case. In the past Term, in Burch v. Louis-
iana52 the Court found that state convictions for
nonpetty offenses rendered by nonunanimous six-
person juries violated the sixth amendment jury-
trial guarantee, but the Court could not explain
the basis for its ruling other than by declaring that
a line had to be drawn and that this practice was
similar to the use ofjuries of less than six members
which had been invalidated in Ballew. Perhaps
these rulings must be dismissed as limited decisions
concerning a relatively technical point in the Bill
of Rights, concerned more with outdated notions
of the function of a jury of one's peers than with
any significant value in the criminal process. Un-
fortunately, other rulings in the area of the sixth
amendment also have assumed an arbitrary quality
as the Court failed to employ a due process meth-
odology in its opinions.
In the "right to counsel" decisions during the
1970's, the Court abandoned not only due process
methodology, but also any attempt to rule on
identifiable principles. The Court's decision in Far-
ella v. California, requiring states to allow a de-
fendant to represent himself at trial, reflected the
historic value of allowing an individual to present
"
0 See Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972) and
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), noted in note
16 supra.
' 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
"2 99 S. Ct. 1623 (1979).
'422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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his case to a jury of his peers.' But the failure to
examine the value of counsel's role in light of due
process values detrimentally affected the Court's
decisions concerning the right to counsel at critical
stages of a criminal prosecution. By 1970, virtually
all such questions seemed to be answered by a
history of decisions extending the right to counsel.
"
Coleman v. Alabama,5; decided in 1970, extended the
right to appointed or retained counsel to prelimi-
nary hearings. It appeared to evidence the Supreme
Court's commitment to the concept that an indi-
vidual defendant must be allowed to have counsel
represent him at any stage in the process wherein
his rights might be impaired significantly. But
during the 1970's, the Court retreated from this
position in two distinct areas: the right to counsel
at pretrial identifications and the right of indigent
defendants to appointed counsel.
Toward the end of the Warren Court era, in
United States v. Wade5 7 and Gilbert v. California,58 the
Supreme Court held that a defendant was entitled
to the presence of counsel at postindictment lineups
or showups and that counsel should be appointed
for an accused who desired counsel but could not
afford one for the lineup. Though the Court based
its rulings on the sixth amendment, the analysis in
Justice Brennan's majority opinions employed the
due process methodology. While the sixth amend-
ment's history and language might have little ap-
plication to pretrial identification procedures, the
need to protect the rights of the accused at trial, by
allowing for meaningful confrontation of witnesses
and by insuring fair, accurate identifications, re-
quired the majority to constitutionalize such a
right.
But the Supreme Court in the 1970's had no
time, or at least no desire, to analyze sixth amend-
ment or due process principles as it limited the
identification rulings to such a small group of cases
that the original decisions easily might as well have
been overruled. In Kirby v. Illinois59 the Court found
that there was no right to counsel at identifications
which occur before a defendant is formally charged
with an offense. According to the plurality opin-
r See Allen. Foreword-Quiescence and Ferment: The 1974
7"Pnn in the Iupreme Court, 66 J. CRIM. L. & C. 391 (1975).
*4,See, e.g., Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967)(right
to counsel at deferred sentencing hearing); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)(equal protection right to
appointed counsel on appeal): Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963)(right to appointed counsel at trial).
, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
"'388 U.S. 218 (1967).
.' 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
; 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (plurality decision).
ion,' the right to counsel attached only after the
initiation of adversary judicial proceedings; how-
ever, the plurality failed to consider whether coun-
sel was essential to insuring fair identification pro-
cedures. Justice Powell, the fifth vote in Kirby, was
more forthright; he admitted that he simply would
not extend the Wade-Gilbert rule.6" The next year in
United States v. Ash,62 the Court held that defendants
were not entitled to the presence of retained or
appointed counsel at photographic identifications.
The majority opinion found that the historic values
of the sixth amendment related to counsel repre-
senting the defendant only when he actually was
confronted with government prosecutors or inves-
tigators following the initiation of adversary pro-
ceedings. Once again, the majority made no at-
tempt to examine the fairness of the system as a
whole. Even though the Warren Court might not
have extended the Wade-Gilbert rule and although
counsel is not always essential to the insurance of
fair identification procedures,M the Court's failure
to analyze the values of fairness and equality of
treatment at issue in these cases cannot be excused.
The Court's related decisions on due process safe-
guards against misidentifications exacerbated the
effect of this failure.
In Stovall v. Denno6 the Court held that testimony
regarding a pretrial identification procedure,
which was not covered by the Wade-Gilbert rule,
and the identification of a defendant at a trial
following such a pretrial confrontation, would be
improper where the confrontation was "unneces-
sarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mis-
taken identification. ' 's Unfortunately, Justice
Brennan's majority opinion was unclear whether
this was a single test for the admissibility of testi-
mony regarding the prior identification and of
testimony constituting an in-court identification of
the defendant. However, the test resembled the test
for determining when a witness may identify a
defendant in court following a pretrial identifica-
65 Justice Stewart authored the opinion in which he
was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Black-
mui and Rehnquist.
61 406 U.S. at 691 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice
White dissented in Kirbr even though he had dissented in
Wade and Gilbert because he honestly recognized that the
cases could not be distinguished. Id. at 705 (White, J.,
dissenting).
62413 U.S. 300 (1973).
" See Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the
Legacy of the Warren Court, 75 MicH. L. REv. 1320, 1372-
73 (1977).




tion which violated the sixth amendment. The in-
court identification is permissible so long as there
is an independent, reliable basis for the identifica-
tion and so long as the out-of-court identification
is not mentioned at trial.6 In 1972 the Court, in
Neil v. Biggers,67 sidestepped some of the questions
in this area as it found that an in-court identifica-
tion, made under circumstances not conducive to
irreparable mistake, was admissible despite possible
suggestiveness in the pretrial identification process.
The Court in Neil gave no answer to whether t
would impose a stricter test regarding testimony
concerning a pretrial identification procedure
which was unnecessarily suggestive but not clearly
conducive to irreparable mistake.
The Neil majority noted that the Supreme Court
had found an identification procedure violative of
due process in only one case.68 This should have
indicated that the Court would adopt a weak
standard for testing the admissability of identifi-
cations which were not governed by earlier sixth
amendment rulings. Thereafter, in Manson v. Brath-
waite,' the Court found that testimony regarding
pretrial identifications of the defendant was ad-
missible, as was in-court identification of the de-
fendant, so long as the pretrial identifications,
when viewed in the totality of the circumstances,
did not undermine the reliability of the witness'
identification. But the Court's opinion failed to
analyze whether this test would result in fair treat-
ment of individual defendants. The Second Circuit
position, formulated by Judge Friendly, was that
testimony regarding out-of-court identification ev-
idence should be excluded whenever it was ob-
tained through unnecessarily suggestive proce-
dures. In rejecting this attempt to insure fair pro-
cedures, the majority opinion in Manson simply
assumed that reliability could be established de-
spite suggestive procedures and that police would
tend to avoid unnecessarily suggestive procedures
for fear that their actions might violate even this
more lenient test. The majority made no attempt
to identify values in the adversary process regard-
ing fair treatment of an accused or to insure relia-
bility in individual cases involving admittedly un-
necessary and suggestive police practices. The ma-
jority's position was made clear by a footnote in
' United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 241 (1967).
There is an absolute bar to testimony regarding the
lineup identification that violated the sixth amendment.
Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1967).
67 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
'See Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440 (1969).
0 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
which it stated that "a suggestive preindictment
identification procedure does not in itself intrude
upon a constitutionally protected interest., 70 This
failure to recognize the existence of due process
values in the identification process itself and in the
use of testimony regarding unfair means of evi-
dence acquisition is the result of the Court's aban-
donment of a due process methodology and its
assertion of sixth amendment "rules" without con-
sidering the values of individual dignity, equality
of treatment, and fairness.
Nowhere is the lack of due process methodology
more apparent than in the cases concerning the
right to appointment of counsel. In 1970, Supreme
Court observers would not have believed that by
1980 the Court's decisions in this area would have
them wistfully remembering the era of Belts v.Brad.71
In Belts the Court found that the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel should not be incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment because it was not,
in all of its dimensions, fundamental to a fair
system ofjustice, so long as the defendant's right to
a fair trial was protected adequately by the use of
the due process clause. Earlier, in Johnson v. Zerbst,
72
the Court held that the sixth amendment required
that an attorney be provided for every defendant
in a federal felony prosecution who could not afford
to retain counsel. Considering not only the history
of the amendment, but also the value of protecting
individuals from arbitrary treatment, the majority
in Johnson employed an absolute rule to insure
fairness in federal proceedings. In Betts, the Court
focused on the concept of due process in finding
that a defendant was entitled to appointed counsel
when the nature of the charge or other circum-
stances regarding the trial made counsel essential
to the provision of a fair trial. The Betts Court did
not hold that there was no right to appointed
counsel in state proceedings, rather it held that
counsel must be appointed only when necessary to
insure a fair trial. Between 1942 and 1963 the
Supreme Court applied this special-circumstances
test to find a right to counsel in virtually every
capital case and in most other prosecutions. Then,
in Gideon v. Wainwright,74 the Court discarded the
Betts approach and applied the sixth amendment
7 Id. at 113 n. 13.
7' 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
7., 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
7" These decisions are reviewed in Israel, Gideon v.
Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 Sup. CT. Rsv.
211,242-61.
74 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
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to the states through the fourteenth amendment in
a manner identical to that which applied to the
federal government. Justice Harlan concurred be-
cause he felt the special-circumstances rule, in fact,
had been eroded into a generalized requirement of
counsel. However, Harlan would have based the
decision on a due process holding that fair trials
required appointment of counsel in most, if not all,
prosecutions of indigent defendants.75
As the 1970's began, it appeared that the Court
was committed to insuring a fair trial process for
indigent defendants. The Justices were unanimous
in Argersinger v. Hamlin76 in ruling that, at a mini-
mum, the state must provide counsel to any indi-
gent defendant it would incarcerate. The majority
opinion ofJustice Douglas carefully stated that the
Court was not considering the question of a right
to counsel where imprisonment was not involved.7
The first major change in this area of equal
treatment of indigent defendants came not in the
"critical stage" or trial cases, but in cases which
raised the issue of an indigent's right to counsel
and to a transcript on appeal. During the late
1950's, and throughout the 1960's, the Supreme
Court consistently found that the equal protection
guarantee entitled indigent defendants to tran-
scripts without cost and to appointed counsel on
appeal in order to insure them equal treatment in
the appellate process.7 Starting with Grfflin v. Illi-
nois7' and culminating in Mayer v. Chicago a the
75ld. at 349 (Harlan, J., concurring). The different
approaches of the Justices to the problem are analyzed
in Israel, note 73 supra.
76 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
7 We must conclude, therefore, that the problems
associated with misdemeanor and petty offenses often
require the presence of counsel to insure the accused a
fair trial. MR. JUsTIcE POWELL suggests that these
problems are raised even in situations where there is
no prospect of imprisonment.... We need not consider
the requirement of the Sixth Amendment as regards
the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved,
however, for here petitioner was in fact sentenced to
jail.
Id. at 36-37 (footnote omitted).
7 These cases are based on the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment and the implied equal
protection guarantee of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. In reviewing a classification that limits the
ability of indigent persons to exercise a fundamental right
the Court will closely examine the law to determine if it
relates to an important government interest. Where no
fundamental right is at stake the Court will not review
wealth classifications seriously. See generallyJ. NowAK, R.
ROTUNDA & J. YOUNc, supra note 16, at 517-27, 619-23,
676-87 (1978 & Supp. 1979-1980).
9351 U.S. 12 (1956).
a404 U.S. 189 (197 1).
Court found that a defendant's inability to pay for
a transcript cduld not constitutionally prohibit his
access to an existing appellate system. In Douglas v.
Califonia8' the Supreme Court held that the state
must provide counsel to the defendant in his first
appeal of right because fair, equal access to the
appellate process was denied if a defendant was
without counsel because of his indigency. Although
Justice Harlan, in dissent, believed that other
means could be used to insure fair treatment of the
defendants on appeal, he noted that there could be
no meaningful distinction between first appeals
and discretionary review.8 2 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed
with Justice Harlan and, in an opinion written by
Chief Judge Haynsworth, found no logical basis
for distinguishing between appeals of right and
discretionary review.83 However, the Supreme
Court disagreed and reversed the court of appeals
in Ross v. Moffit.84 The Ross majority, in an opinion
by Justice Rehnquist, found that a defendant was
not entitled to appointed counsel after his first
appeal of right. The majority opinion in Ross gave
some consideration to due process principles, as-
serting that there was no unfairness to indigents
seeking discretionary review so long as those who
could not afford counsel were not "singled out by
the State and denied meaningful access to the
appellate system because of their poverty. ' ' 5 After
describing the preparation of papers for discretion-
ary review as a "somewhat arcane art,' " the ma-
jority concluded that the quantum of fairness to
which an indigent defendant is entitled under due
process is met by granting that individual a tran-
script and counsel during his first appeal. But there
was no substantive analysis of why the concept of
fairness and equal access to existing decisionmak-
ing entities should be so limited, particularly in
light of sixth amendment and equal protection
values. Not surprisingly, the Court then went on to
restrict the right to a free transcript in collateral-
attack proceedings when a defendant failed to
request one on direct appeal.8 7 It is at least possible
that the Warren Court would have refrained, for
practical reasons, from granting counsel to all per-
sons seeking certiorarif.8 However, the Court soon
81 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
aId. at 366 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
s Moffit v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1973), rev'd,
417 U.S. 600 (1974).
84417 U.S. 600 (1974).
"Id. at 611.
""Id. at 616.
" United States v. MacCollum, 426 U.S. 317 (1976).
' Israel, supra note 63, at 1336-39.
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proved that it indeed was following a new path,
not determined by practical considerations, in de-
scribing the parameters of indigents' rights.'
During the past Term the Court, in Scott v.
Illinois,90 ruled that a defendant who could not
afford counsel need not be given appointed counsel
under any circumstances if the defendant in fact
was not sentenced to a term of imprisonment. That
"rule" is outrageous; nothing in Belts indicated
that there was a class of cases in which a right to
appointed counsel might never attach under the
concept of due process. None of the opinions in the
Johnson-Belts period indicated that the Court would
deny a class of indigent defendants the right to
counsel in specific cases where counsel might be
necessary to a fair trial.9 ' But the majority opinion
in Scott, by Justice Rehnquist, was even more sur-
prising than the result. Justice Rehnquist had the
audacity to claim that Argersinger decided the issue
in Scott because the Argersinger petitioner, in his
petition for certiorari, sought a ruling concerning
the right to counsel in all cases where imprisonment
was a possibility. 92 Although Justice Rehnquist
mentioned the portion of the Argersinger opinion
which stated that the Court "need not consider the
requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards
the right to counsel where loss of liberty is not
involved ... for here petitioner was in fact sen-
tenced to jail," 93 he never mentioned the fact that
this passage explicitly left the question open. At
the end of the Scott opinion Justice Rehnquist does
find that the earlier opinion was not "unmistakably
clear," but he concludes that Argersinger did "de-
limit the constitutional right" and that "[elven
were the matter res nova," actual imprisonment
should be the limit for a right to appointed coun-
sel .94
Without considering sixth amendment or due
process values, and with some vague references to
the social costs involved in appointment of counsel
and the creation of confusion for lower courts if the
appointment rule were to be extended to any other
cases, the majority in Scott simply eliminated all
5
"J The Court in 1974 upheld a statute requiring con-
victed indigent defendants, under certain circumstances,
to repay to the state the costs of the "free" legal defense
as a condition of probation. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S.
40 (1974).
9" 440 U.S. 367 k1979).
"l The pre-Gideon cases are reviewed in Israel, supra
note 73, at 246-61.
" Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 369, 373 (1979).
w Id. at 370. The quoted passage is reprinted more
fully in note 77 supra.
94 440 U.S. at 373.
claims for appointed counsel in any case where
actual incarceration is not imposed. This decision
means that an indigent, regardless of his individual
capability to represent himself, will never have a
right to counsel in any case where actual incarcer-
ation is not imposed: not even if the sanction
involves a severe fine with major impact on the
individual's life, the loss of a license necessary for
his employment, or the creation of a criminal
record which may damage the individual in a
variety of ways. Additionally, this rule will apply
to every stage of the criminal process; if an indigent
is not to be sentenced to imprisonment, he has no
right to appointed counsel during questioning, at
a postindictment identification, at the preliminary
hearing, at trial, at the sentencing hearing, or on
any appeal. While many state courts may require
counsel in cases where there is a possibility of
imprisonment in order to avoid foreclosing the
possibility of imprisonment prior to trial,9 5 Scott
eliminates the federal claim for counsel at all crit-
ical stages. That such a serious result should come
about with absolutely no consideration of due proc-
ess values is shocking. Even if the Court were to
find the sixth amendment irrelevant, it should have
examined due process values. Were this a civil case
where a party was asking for some procedural
safeguard, the Court, employing the Mathews bal-
ancing test.6 would have examined the worth of
the safeguard to the individual and its value in
insuring a reliable fact determination. It would
then have weighed these benefits against the socie-
tal cost imposed by the requirement. The Scott
majority engaged in no such analysis. Use of the
suggested due process methodology model would
have required the Court to examine the value in a
fair criminal process to both the individual and
society, the chance that individual rights were
endangered by the absence of counsel, and the
societal worth of having the added assurance of
systemic fairness and equality of treatment in the
adversary process.97 Instead, the- Court simply as-
serted that the sixth amendment did not require
" Several states considered the problems of imple-
menting the Argersinger ruling and chose to grant counsel
to those defendants charged with an offense punishable
by imprisonment, regardless of the actual sentence. A
listing of these state decisions, court rules, and statutes is
contained in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. at 386 n.18 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting). See UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL,
PROeEURE 321 (b) commentary. See also Duke, The Right
to Appointed Counsel: Argersinger and Beyond, 12 AM,. CRIM.
L. REv. 601 (1975).
' See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
5
'See note 32 and accompanying text supra.
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counsel in such cases. There is no excusing the
failure to consider the relevance of due process
values to this issue. It is hard to believe that the
Supreme Court issued an opinion that significantly
altered the ability of a class of people to achieve a
fair trial in cases which may have a substantial,
detrimental impact on their lives without ever
considering the values of the due process clause or
even indicating that fairness was a concern in the
decision.s
The most surprising vote in Scott was that of
Justice PoweIl. 9 He concurred in the majority
opinion because he believed that lower courts
needed a definitive ruling on this issue. However,
Powell concurred "with the hope that in due time
a majority will recognize that a more flexible rule
is consistent with due process and will better serve
the cause of justice."'" In his concurring opinion
in Argersinger, Justice Powell noted the problem
inherent in trying to anticipate a defendant's sen-
tence and urged a case-by-case due process ap-
proach to the problem.' 0' It is unclear why he
hesitated to "split his vote" in this case and write
a single judge opinion announcing the result that
would have employed his Argersinger analysis. This
would have required courts to make a Belts-type
determination in "minor" cases, where there was a
possibility but no actual sentence of imprisonment.
Predictably, Justices Brennan, Marshall, Black-
mun, and Stevens, dissented.0 2 They noted that
prior decisions such as Argersinger assumed that
serious criminal prosecutions where there was a
possibility of imprisonment for six months or more
required the presence of counsel .to equalize the
position of the state and defendant.
Unless Justice Powell once again focuses on due
98 The Scott opinion only mentions "fairness" as it
describes the Betts rule. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. at 371.
99 Justice Powell usually takes some cognizance of due
process values and the Court's duty to evaluate the
fairness of the criminal proceeding. Compare Scott v.
Illinois, 440 U.S. at 374 (Powell, J., concurring) with
County Court v. Allen, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 2230
(1979)(Powell, J., dissenting to Court ruling that pre-
sumption of possession and handgun in an automobile
justifies a guilty verdict in that case).
'00 440 U.S. at 375 (Powell, J., concurring).
11Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 44
(1972)(Powell, J., concurring).
"0 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. at 375 (Brennan,J.,joined
by Marshall and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). Justice Stevens
appears to be joining with Justices Brennan and Marshall
more frequently in criminal cases; the reader may find it
interesting to examine the voting patterns in the cases
noted in this issue of the Journal with that observation in
mind.
process methodology, there may be further inroads
on the previously established rights of indigents to
free transcripts and appointed counsel. Once the
majority has gotten to the position of issuing opin-
ions like Scott, which do no more than announce a
ruling under the sixth and fourteenth amendments
with no attempt at value analysis, there is nothing
to stop it from announcing more and more restric-
tive rules. Perhaps the Court will achieve the result
to which Justice Frankfurter sarcastically referred
in his opinion in Griffin v. Illinois:
To sanction such a ruthless consequence, inevitably
resulting from a money hurdle erected by a State,
would justify a latter-day Anatole France to add
one more item to his ironic comments on the "majes-
tic equality" of the law. "The law, in its majestic
equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep





Despite the continuing swirl of public interest
around Miranda v. Arizona,' 4 the basic rules of that
decision continue to live peacefully at the eye of
the storm. Nothing remarkable has happened to
the rules regarding the questioning of defendants
that are based on the fifth amendment, although
it appears that the sixth amendment may emerge
as the most significant protection for the defendant
regarding questioning in the adversarial process. 5
The Court has placed some limits on the Miranda
ruling, such as finding that the IRS need not give
full Miranda warnings to taxpayers who are not in
custody'16 and that the police need not give warn-
ings to a defendant who volunteers to go to a police
station for questioning. 07 The Court also has in-
dicated the full set of warnings need not be given
to grand jury witnesses. '0 Clearly, the Burger
"a Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12,23 (1956)(quotingJ.
COURNos, A MODERN PLUTARCH 27 (1928)) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
o' 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'"See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), ex-
amined at notes 132-34 and accompanying text infra.
Although the public views the Miranda rule, based on the
fifth amendment, as the defendant's greatest safeguard,
the sixth amendment may emerge as a more significant
protection.
" Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
:07 Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977).
'0 Four Justices of the Court took this position in
United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976)
(plurality opinion by Burger, C.J., joined by White,
Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ.). Regarding the merit of the
competing argument on this Miranda issue, see Stone,
supra note 3, at 154-67.
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Court has kept the Miranda doctrine in check; the
Court has not excluded any testimony from evi-
dence because of Miranda since the Chief Justice
took office.' °9 In one respect the Court undercut
the effectiveness of Miranda when it held that state-
ments gained in violation of that ruling could be
used for impeaching a defendant's testimony at
trial, so long as the statements used for impeach-
ment were not obtained in a manner that violated
the basic fifth amendment prohibition of com-
pelled testimony.1
In recent years the Court has examined the
underlying basis of Miranda's exclusionary rule and
found it to be justifiable, if at all, only as a means
to deter police from subverting the principles un-
derlying the fifth and sixth amendments. This view
differs from the Warren Court rationale for Mi-
randa, which relied upon both the deterrence of
certain police activities and the belief that a state's
use of evidence gathered from defendants who did
not fully understand their fifth and sixth amend-
ment rights violates the principle of fundamental
fairness. 1 ' This redefinition of the Miranda values
makes it unlikely that the defendant complaining
of a violation of the Miranda rule will obtain re-
lief.l 2 More importantly, the Court's redefinition
of the value of Miranda's exclusionary rule has
diverted its attention from developing standards
for determining the type of police practices that
may be used when questioning a defendant outside
the presence of counsel. The ultimate question in
developing these standards is not one of waiver in
a technical sense; instead, it is a question concern-
ing the permissibility of particular investigatory
practices in a society with a historic commitment
to the values represented by the self-incrimination,
the right to counsel, and the due process clauses.
Attention paid to the Miranda rule has distracted
the Court from defining the basic fifth amendment
values concerning compulsion, the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel values, and the due process
values regarding individual dignity and fairness.
The Court also has failed to define the scope of
il Stone, supra note 3, at 100-01.
""Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975); Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
'I' Compare Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442-43,
460-63 (1966) with Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433,
439-44 (1974).
112 Professor Stone has noted that the shifted focus
from protection of individual rights to the effectiveness
of a deterrence device may foreshadow the demise of
Miranda. Stone, supra note 3, at 123-25. Professor Israel
believes that the Miranda doctrine is not in significant
danger. Israel, supra note 63, at 1383, 1387.
permissible police practices in procuring a waiver
of rights after the Miranda warnings or in obtaining
a confession from the defendant after the Miranda
warnings are given and a waiver is executed."
3
Consequently, these practices are evaluated by the
old voluntariness test, developed by the Court in
pre-Miranda years under the concepts of due process
and the fifth amendment's prohibition of compel-
ling testimony. The test is two pronged. To be
admissible under the test, the confession must be
gained in a manner that does not undermine the
defendant's will to the point that the statement is
unreliable,' 14 and, even if the confession is reliable,
it will not be admissible if it was obtained in a
manner which violates accepted societal standards
for police practices and respect for individual dig-
nity." 5 While it is hoped that Miranda warnings
will deter coercive police activity, it is the volun-
tariness test which protects a defendant against
police brutality, trickery, or "the third degree."
The Court should once again focus its attention on
respect for individual dignity and fairness, through
the use of a due process methodology, in the context
of examining interrogation practices.
The Court appeared to give some consideration
to basic due process values in North Carolina v.
Butler"6 when it held that the government did not
need to obtain an explicit waiver of a defendant's
fifth and sixth amendment rights in order to use
his statements so long as the defendant received
proper Miranda warnings. Justice Stewart's major-
ity opinion found that "[t]he question is not one of
form, but rather whether the defendant in fact
knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delin-
eated in the Miranda case."' " 7 Previously the Court
held that a defendant's silence following the warn-
'13 The Court avoided one such issue in Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975), wherein it held that a
defendant could be questioned following his invocation
of his right to silence, if there was sufficient break in
questioning, he received new warnings, and his invoca-
tion of right was scrupulously honored. The Court did
not consider the defendant's claim, raised in the lower
court, that he had been tricked by the police falsely
telling him that he had been implicated by the testimony
of another person.
114 See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
"5 See, e.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949). See also Allen, The
Supreme Court, Federalism and State Systems of CriminalJustice,
8 DE PAUL L. REv. 213, 235 (1959). See generally Y.
KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 510-18 (4th ed. 1974).
:1699 S. Ct. 1755 (1979).
17Id. at 1757.
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ing could not be used against him since to do so
would subvert the worth of the warning."" Thus,
the Court's consideration of the totality of the
circumstances, rather than use of a per se rule, was
not a rejection of Miranda. Instead, the Court ex-
plored the circumstances to insure that the defend-
ant's will was not overborn in violation of the fifth
amendment, that the right to counsel was not
subverted by extracting evidence from the defend-
ant in an unfair manner in violation of the sixth
amendment, and that the confession was both
reliable and was gained in a manner conforming
to the traditional notions of human dignity and
worth. The Court in Butler was willing to allow
lower courts to determine, on a case-by-case basis,
if these basic values were violated. This willingness
contrasts with Warren Court rulings concerning
exclusionary rules which sought to control the in-
vestigatory process by per se rules that could be
enforced by a reviewing court." 9 A court cannot
accept a truly value-oriented due process method-
ology if it is intent upon having decisions which
can turn upon a single objective factor, so that the
decisions of the lower courts may quickly be re-
viewed by Justices reading certiorari memos. Thus,
Butler represents a step in a right direction by its
focus upon fairness and voluntariness. The Court's
decisions in this area will be clearer if it pays less
attention to Miranda and seeks to define the values
of the fifth and sixth amendments and the concept
of due process, so as to clarify the voluntariness
test. Such an approach might lead to renewed
interest in other means for protecting defendants
during interrogation, such as conducting the ques-
tioning before a judicial law officer, a suggestion
made by the late Professor Kauper, Justice Schae-
fer, and others across the past forty years. r2'
The Supreme Court also shifted its focus from
technical interpretations of the Miranda rule to
questions of voluntariness and respect for the in-
dividual in Fare v. Michael C.'2 ' In Fare, the Court
found that ajuvenile's request to see his probation
11 Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
"o Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren
Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 532.
'
2
"See, e.g., W. SCHAEFER, THE SUSPECT AND SOCIEr"
76-81 (1966); Kamisar, Kauper's 'Judicial Examination of
the Accused" Forty Years Later-Some Comments on a Remark-
able Article, 73 MICH. L. REV. 15, 32 (1973); Kauper,
Judicial Examination of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third
Degree, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1224, 1239 (1932), reprinted in 73
Mich. L. Rev. 39, 54 (1974); Pound, Legal Interrogation of
Persons Accused or Suspected of Crime, 24 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
1014, 1017 (1934).
121 99 S. Ct. 2560 (1979).
officer was not equivalent to a request for counsel.
Therefore, the request did not require a cutoff of
questioning under Miranda or the exclusion of the
juvenile's subsequent statements, so long as the
juvenile was properly advised of his fifth and sixth
amendment rights and so long as the statements
were truly voluntary. Justice Blackmun's majority
opinion found that since the probation officer was
not the equivalent of counsel, the request was not
an invocation of sixth amendment rights.
However, the important issue in the case should
not have been whether the juvenile's waiver was
proper under Miranda, but whether the juvenile's
rights to be free from compelled testimony, to be
represented by counsel, and to be treated fairly in
the adversary process were honored by the inves-
tigating authorities. Whether the juvenile defend-
ant signed a waiver of rights should make no
difference to his claim that his will was overborn
by the investigatory practices that were conducted
outside of the presence of any adult concerned with
his interests. While the majority opinion noted that
the individual circumstances regarding the ques-
tioning of ajuvenile must be closely scrutinized to
insure that the juvenile understood his rights and
that the voluntariness/fair treatment test was met
in the particular case,x2 the opinion spent too little
time examining the circumstances of that case.
Justice Powell filed a strong dissent questioning
whether the police overbore the will of the juvenile
and whether the young defendant was a fair match
for the police questioners outside of the presence of
an adult concerned with the minor's interest. He
also questioned whether the police acted in a fun-
damentally unfair manner when they refused to
contact thejuvenile's probation officer.Y'"
Justice Marshall,joined byJustices Brennan and
Stevens in dissent, would have employed a per se
rule to exclude statements made by ajuvenile after
he requested to consult with an adult who would
represent his interests.
1 24
The Court's seeming adversity to excluding
confessions from trialiss continued this past Term
in Parker v. Randolph.'26 There the Court upheld the
admission into evidence of confessions of codefen-
dants when none of them took the stand, but when
each of them had confessed implicating himself
and some or all of the nontestifying codefendants.
22Id. at 2572.
i23 Id. at 2575-77(Powell, J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 2574 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and
Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
'1
2 See generally Stone, note 3 supra.
'299 S. Ct. 2132 (1979)(plurality decision).
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Although there was no majority opinion, a plural-
ity of the Justices'2 7 found that there was no sig-
nificant confrontation clause problem because the
jury was cautioned to consider each statement
against only the particular defendant who made
that statement and because each defendant had
confessed and, thereby, indicated his guilt. While
this ruling may be a correct conclusion regarding
the meaning of the confrontation clause, the opin-
ion spends little time examining the concept of
fairness in the adjudicatory system, which should
be the key issue in any confession case. Justice
Blackmun recognized this in his concurring opin-
ion where he examined the question of whether or
not the defendants were harmed significantly by
the admission of the statements into evidence.
12
s
Despite the Court's reluctance during the past
decade to strike down the use of confessions at trial,
it has limited police interrogation practices by
means of the sixth amendment right to counsel.
Fifteen years ago, in Massiah v. United States,29 the
Supreme Court invalidated the use of testimony
gained from a defendant by a government agent-
informant outside the presence of his retained
counsel since the adversary process had begun prior
to this activity. In Brewer v. Williams130 the Court
resurrected the Massiah rule and extended it to
prohibit the use of evidence police obtained from
a defendant after he had conferred with counsel
because the defendant had not clearly waived his
right to counsel.
After Professor Kamisar's 140-page analysis of
the record, opinion, and implications of Brewer'3 1
there is little reason to trouble the reader with the
details of the case. But it is interesting to note how
Brewer demonstrates the need for the adoption of
a due process methodology in resolving the Bill of
Rights questions. The case involved the abduction
and murder of a ten-year-old girl in Des Moines,
Iowa. After taking the young girl from a local
YMCA in Des Moines, the defendant disposed of
her body in the countryside and went to Daven-
127 Justice Rehnquist wrote an opinion which was in
part a majority opinion and, in part, a plurality opinion
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and
White.
'28 Parker v. Randolph, 99 S. Ct. at 2141(Blackmun,
J.. concurring).
'2377 U.S. 201 (1964).
""" 4 3 0 U.S. at 387, 398-400 (1977).
"' See Kamisar, Foreword: Brewer v. Williams-A Hard
Look at a Discomfiting Record, 66 GEO. L.J. 209 (1977) and
Kamisar, Brewer r. Williams, Massiah and Miranda: ihat is
"Interreation"? When Does it Matter?, 67 GEo. L.J. I (1978),
for a complete analysis of the record, opinion, and impli-
cations of Brewer.
port, Iowa. The police searched unsuccessfully for
the girl. Later, the defendant, while in Davenport,
called a Des Moines lawyer who advised him to
turn himself in to the Davenport police. The de-
fendant did so, and the Davenport police and
arraigning judge advised him of his Miranda rights.
The defendant talked to a lawyer in Davenport
and to his Des Moines lawyer by telephone. The
police officers refused to allow counsel to accom-
pany the defendant on the ride back to Des Moines,
but they promised the defendant's lawyers that
they would not question the defendant during the
trip. Despite that promise, and the defendant's
indication of an unwillingness to discuss matters
with the police until he could meet with counsel in
Des Moines, the officers asked him about the lo-
cation of the girl's body. One officer played upon
the defendant's religious beliefs by asking him to
help them provide a "Christian burial" for the
little girl. The defendant then told the police the
location of the body.
The exclusion of the testimony in this case ap-
pears to be a severe sanction for police practices
which seem neither unfair nor contrary to generally
accepted notions of respect for the individual.
However, the record was unclear and the interro-
gating officer apparently gave several versions of
the events. It is difficult to determine the extent to
which the officers actively sought to undermine the
decision of the defendant not to talk to them. This
problem is compounded by the fact that the de-
fendant recently had escaped from a mental hos-
pital and that he had intense religious beliefs. It
may be that the Supreme Court, after employing
the totality-of-the-circumstances test, felt that the
record simply failed to demonstrate that the de-
fendant had waived his previously asserted right to
counsel. Indeed, the Brewer majority may not have
intended to do anything other than to show dis-
approval of what might have been a deliberate
attempt to subvert the role of counsel by police
officers who intentionally broke their promise to
counsel. In two footnotes at the end of the majority
opinion, the Justices indicated that they would
give the state additional time to reindict the de-
fendant so that he would not be set free, and that
they would not overturn a finding that the child's
body and evidence regarding the body could be
admitted into evidence because it inevitably would
have been discovered. 3 2 Nevertheless,Justice Stew-
'- Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 406 n.12, 407
n. 13 (1979). On retrial, evidence regarding the body was
admitted and Williams was convicted again. Y. KAMISAR,
W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL. MODERN CRIMINAL PROC.DURE
192 (4th ed. Supp. 1979).
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art's majority opinion also seemed to establish a
much stricter rule for the waiver of the right to
counsel once adversary proceedings have been ini-
tiated than was true for the waiver of rights under
Miranda. The opinion emphasized that judicial pro-
ceedings against Williams commenced at the ar-
raignment in Davenport. t13 The opinion then
found that "the clear rule of Massiah is that once
adversary proceedings have commenced against an
individual, he has a right to legal representation
when the government interrogates him. ' m Justice
Stewart concluded that it was "incumbent upon
the State to prove 'an intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege.' "135
It may be that the Court intended to establish a
rule which would require an explicit waiver of the
right to counsel for any interrogation following the
initiation of adversary proceedings against the de-
fendant. Yet this possibility must be contrasted
with the Butler ruling that an explicit waiver was
not required following the giving of the Miranda
warning. It makes little sense to have the strictness
of waiver rules regarding fifth and sixth amend-
ment rights depend on the determination of
whether formal proceedings have been initiated
against the defendant, unless the Court feels that
such a distinction is justified by the historic com-
mitment to the principle that an accused shall not
stand alone against the government once he has
been charged with a crime.
It is hoped that the Court would not make such
a distinction based simply upon an arguable view
of the history of the sixth amendment, nor upon a
policy determination concerning the feasibility of
providing counsel for persons either before or after
the initiation ofjudicial proceedings. Regardless of
whether the Court will bring the sixth amendment
waiver rule into line with the Butler approach, or
whether it will enforce the Massiah-Brewer rule with
strictness, its ruling will not be justifiable unless the
Court considers the need to have counsel before
and after the initiation of formal procedings as a
means of insuring a fair adversarial process and
protecting the defendant's right to remain silent.
The benefit of a strict waiver rule must be weighed
against the cost of eliminating any possibility of
quesiioning in many cases-a cost that may be
quite high if it involves situations where the ques-
tioning seems necessary to the solution of a partic-
ularly serious crime or necessary to prevent the loss
of human life.
lU 430 U.S. at 399.
Id. at 401 (footnote omitted).
I:n Id. at 404 (quotingJohnson v. Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458,
464 (1938)).
With a due process analysis the Court may
demonstrate a willingness to tolerate some discus-
sions with the defendant outside the counsel's pres-
ence where the police are not engaging in unfair
tactics to compel testimony by the defendant and
where there is some need for prompt questioning
shortly after the detention of a defendant. The
ultimate question in this area is what should be
required of an officer in the Brewer situation if there
exist reasonable grounds to believe that the child
might still be alive when the defendant is first
seized and that the failure to question the defend-
ant promptly, outside of the presence of counsel,
effectively will preclude finding the child.' 36 Pro-
fessor Kaplan suggested tempering the use of ex-
clusionary rules to permit the use of evidence
gained in violation of fourth amendment rulings
when the exclusionary rule would prevent prose-
cution of the most serious cases or where the police
have honestly attempted to meet their responsibil-
ity to adhere to a constitutional command. 137 Such
impact considerations, as well as the value consid-
erations, should play a part in determining the
strictness of the rules that will be used to regulate
police discussions or interrogations of defendants
under a due process methodology approach to the
sixth amendment issue.
PRIVACY
The Court's rulings on the fourth amendment
since Mapp v. Ohio,Iss which imposed an exclusion-
ary rule on the states,'1 have made this subject the
darling of criminal procedure classes. Although the
numerous types of searches may necessitate a series
of limited holdings, it is unfortunate that the Su-
preme Court has not attempted to develop a frame-
work for its decisions. A beneficial side product of
the Court's technical approach to the area has been
the production of a truly excellent treatise on this
subject 140 and a host of excellent articles by judges
and law professors who have attempted to stitch
the Court's patchwork rulings into.a quilt that suits
their individual tastes.t 41 While I will not attempt
" The record in Brewer indicated that the police knew
that the child was dead before the interrogation. See text
accompanying note 131 supra.
117 Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN.
L. REV. 1027, 1050 (1974).
'38 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
'The fourth amendment had been held to require
exclusion of evidence gained in violation of its principles
in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
140W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT (1978)(three volumes).
141 Citations to many of these articles may be found in
Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE &J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL
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to join in that quilting bee, I would like to examine
a few of the Court's rulings to show that the focus
in fourth amendment cases has been so narrow as
to endanger protection of privacy interests that fall
outside of the fourth amendment.
Let us first consider the problem of car searches.
In two of the three cases decided last Term involv-
ing automobile stops and searches, the defendants
prevailed. In Delaware v. Prouse142 the Court held
that police could not randomly stop automobiles
to check driver licenses, just as the police are not
allowed to stop a person without cause. 43 In Ar-
kansas v. Sanders'44 the Court ruled that a search of
luggage found within an automobile could not be
conducted without a warrant. However, the ma-
jority opinion in Sanders explicitly endorsed a car-
search exception to the warrant requirement, 45
which was implied by a number of earlier rulings
by the Court, whereby a car could be searched on
the existence of probable cause alone even though
a warrant would have to be obtained to search
containers within the vehicle. The state was able
to prevail in Rakas v. Illinois,146 where the Court
took a more limited view of privacy and held that
a nonowner (passenger or driver) in an automobile
did not have standing to challenge a search of the
automobile unless he could establish an expecta-
tion of privacy in the automobile which went
beyond his legitimate presence in the vehicle at the
time. The majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist
found that traditional notions of standing were
irrelevant to this problem because the nonowner
lacked a privacy interest that was protected by the
fourth amendment.
In each of the three cases, the Justices examined
the privacy interest of citizens only if the police
activity constituted a seizure that fell within the
scope of the fourth amendment (a formal stop or
seizure of property). In addition, the Court held
PROCEDURE chs. 5, It, 12 (4th ed. 1974 & Supp. 1979).
Two of the recent articles which, in the view of the
author, are particularly helpful in trying to construct an
analytic framework for these cases have appeared in this
journal. Grano, Foreword-Perplexing Questions About Three
Basic Fourth Amendment Issues: Fourth Amendment Activity,
Probable Cause, and the Warrant Requirement, 69 J. Cr1M. L.
& C. 425 (1978); Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions,
Claims of Sham and Fourfold Probable Cause, 68 J. GRiM. L.
& C. 198 (1977).
14 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979).
... Brown v. Texas, 99 S. Ct. 2637 (1979).
14 99 S. Ct. 2586 (1979).
145 Id. at 2591.
146 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
that only persons with a specific expectation of
privacy in the car or the property (and no one else)
could complain if the police made such an intru-
sion without either a reasonable suspicion of crim-
inal activity (for a stop), probable cause for a
seizure (for an arrest or a search of the car), or
probable cause and a search warrant (for a search
of containers within a car).
The fourth amendment expectation of privacy
standing requirement and the social cost of exclud-
ing reliable information from a criminal trial ap-
parently have precluded the Court from defining
privacy values that might be protected by the due
process clauses. Because the Court has not exam-
ined privacy interests apart from fourth amend-
ment cases, one might consider these decisions
irrelevant to that issue. But these fourth amend-
ment cases might be relevant to a civil suit brought
against police officers for putting electronic track-
ing devices ("beepers") on many cars in order to
keep track of the movements of those cars. They
also might be determinative of a civil suit against
the police for installing cameras at intersections of
public streets in the business district of a major
city. The police might assert that following the cars
may lead them to evidence in cases in which they
suspect a crime will take place, but lack probable
cause for that belief. The television cameras argu-
ably might be an aid to the reduction of street-
corner crime in the city.
However, the Court's limited approach to fourth
amendment cases should be irrelevant to these
hypothetical problems for two reasons. First of all,
they do not entail a search practice that is the
equivalent of any practice traditionally associated
with the investigation of crime that has been ex-
amined in fourth amendment cases. Secondly, in-
dividual and governmental interests in these "non-
crime" cases are different from those previously
examined by the Court. The real problem will arise
with the claims of people who assert that they have
not engaged in any criminal activity and that the
government is monitoring their movements either
for no identifiable reason or because they have
opposed certain government policies. Will courts
seriously examine the claim that television cameras
and "beepers" will inhibit the freedom to act and
speak in manners that are protected by the first
amendment? It is easy enough to consider a gen-
eralized privacy interest in these cases and then
inject fourth amendment language into the discus-
sion, but that will only distort the analysis neces-
sary to examine the privacy rights of the general
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public in these cases. 147 Unfortunately, the Court
has left open the question of whether it will seri-
ously examine such privacy problems under the
due process clauses.
In Whalen v. Roe148 the Court upheld a statute
which required doctors and pharmacists to report
to the state the names of persons receiving medi-
cines containing certain narcotic drugs. The ma-
jority opinion upheld the statute because of the
importance of the government interest in limiting
the usage of dangerous drugs and because of the
restrictions placed on the use of data gained from
the medical reports. The majority opinion in
Whalen did note that the collection of data on
individuals normally has been accompanied by a
duty to avoid unwarranted disclosure of that infor-
mation and, in addition, that this restriction "ar-
guably has its root in the Constitution."''
Justice Brennan, in a separate opinion, stated
his belief that government data collection practices
were limited by the existence of a constitutionally
protected privacy interest.150 This point was con-
tested by Justice Stewart, in a separate opinion,
who found that the Constitution did not establish
any right to privacy apart from the fourth amend-
ment. " ' While these Justices spoke only for them-
selves, their opinions give an indication that the
Court's rulings in the fourth amendment area may
one day be critical to an examination of problems
concerning generalized data collection practices
such as our "beeper" and television camera hypo-
theticals.
The Court has restricted the right of individuals
to bring private actions, such as those in our ex-
amples, on the basis of the first amendment by
requiring that individual plaintiffs show tangible
injury to their own first amendment activities in
order to demonstrate the necessary ripeness and
standing to maintain the suit, regardless of the
constitutionality of the government data collection
practice.152 To date, the Court has granted "pri-
1,7One federal appellate court has examined the
"beeper" problem under a strict fourth amendment anal-
ysis with the predictable result that the judges were
unable to come to grips with the privacy interest of the
general public to be free from unjustifiable data collection
practices. United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859 (5th
Cir. 1975), af'd per curiam on rehearing, 537 F.2d 227 (5th
Cir. 1976) (8-8 vote).
'48 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
"
9 Id. at 605.156 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 606 (1977)(Brennan,
J., concurring).
'51 Id. at 607-09 (Stewart, J., concurring).
'
52 See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972); Fifth Ave.
vacy" protection to first amendment interests only
in those cases holding that associations need not
disclose their membership to the government ex-
cept in those circumstarices where the government
has a compelling need for that information,53 and
in a few cases placing some limits on required
disclosures for governmental employees and can-
didates for government licensed occupations.
t15
Thus it would be difficult, if not impossible, for
private persons to prevail in an action challenging
the government practices in the "beeper" and tel-
evision hypotheticals on the basis of the first
amendment. If the fourth amendment rulings in-
dicate that there is no additional constitutionally
recognized privacy interest contained in the con-
cept of liberty as protected by the due process
clauses, then the plaintiffs would have no possible
basis for their suit, absent a claim that the govern-
ment is improperly distributing information gained
from its "beepers" and cameras. A constitutional
claim regarding improper distribution of informa-
tion also seems unlikely to prevail given the Court's
ruling that a person's interest in his or her reputa-
tion is not constitutionally protected by the due
process clause.'ss
If the Court would take a technical approach to
the definition of privacy interests, fourth amend-
ment rulings such as Rakas indicate that it certainly
would fail to consider the more generalized consti-
tutional value and privacy that is endangered by
the television or "beeper" practices in the hypo-
theticals. Those practices do not constitute searches
in a traditional sense, for they disclose information
that could be gained by a police officer simply by
following the car or by observing the street corner.
Although the street corner television example pre-
sents a classic "plain view" situation, one might
argue that the "beeper" practice constitutes a
search because the police must attach a device to
a privately owned car. Yet, if we consider the
problem in terms of the fourth amendment alone,
Peace Parade Comm. v. Gray, 480 F.2d 326 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 948 (1974).
'5 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm.,
372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958). See also Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
i"i These rulings have been based on vagueness and
overbreadth grounds. See, e.g., Law Students Civil Rights
Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154
(1971); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). However,
these rulings have not expanded first amendment "pri-
vacy" to any significant degree. See Baird v. Arizona, 401
U.S. 1 (1971).
15 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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it is difficult to envision the current Court finding
that such a practice so invades a traditionally
recognized expectation of privacy that it should
result in the suppression of reliable evidence, as
long as there was cause to suspect that the "beeper"
would produce evidence of a crime.56 The aversion
to using the exclusionary rule in the television and
"beeper" hypotheticals should not result in a total
failure to consider the privacy interest of the gen-
eral public, but the fourth amendment rulings of
the Court in recent years indicate that such a result
is likely. For example, during the past Term the
Supreme Court held that there was no limit on the
government's ability to make covert entries to in-
stall electronic devices once the government had a
proper warrant if it used a "reasonable" means of
making the entry. 57 The Court focused its atten-
tion on the warrant requirement and entirely failed
to consider whether other liberty interests of the
individual were endangered by such practices. Sim-
ilarly, the Court has held that a search warrant
can be executed at anytime, as a result of which
there is no limit on the ability of government agents
to show up in the middle of the night to execute a
warrant, even though they could wait until day-
light hours when they would have less impact on
the privacy interests of the searched individuals. 5
As a result of these decisions, if the government has
a properly executed search warrant, it can execute
covert entries into the homes of innocent third
parties, or it can execute search warrants in the
middle of the night at the homes of innocent people
who may not be aware of the evidence in their
residences. In Zurcher v. Stanford Daily'59 the Court
found that third parties had no greater privacy
interests than people suspected of a crime when it
came to the execution of search warrants. The
ruling was made in a case wherein the police sought
to search the offices of a newspaper, a fact which
indicates that one cannot assume that the arguable
existence of first amendment interests in our tele-
vision or "beeper" examples would inhibit the
Court from using its strict fourth amendment ap-
proach in those cases. The fact that the govern-
ment's use of audio-visual cameras on each street
corner might gain information about and from
'5'See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974)
(upholding warrantless seizure of car to examine exterior
of vehicle).
Dalia v. United States. 99 S. Ct. 1682 (1979).
sGooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430 (1974). It
is possible that Gooding does not resolve this issue. See W.
LAFAVE, supra note 140, at § 4.7.
'. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
private persons that could be described as "testi-
monial- will also be of no relevance to the fourth
amendment privacy determination, since the St-
preme Court has held that the government is free
to search for and seize testimonial information in
compliance with the fourth amendment require-
ment.
160
It seems difficult to believe that the Court would
focus so narrowly on the fourth amendment that it
would fail to consider the privacy interest of the
general public-until one examines the Court's
ruling last Term in Smith v. Maryland.'6' In Smith
the Court found that there was no fourth amend-
ment violation in placing pen registers, i.e., devices
which record the numbers dialed from a telephone,
on the telephone line of a specific person suspected
of threatening a witness. Such a technique was
permissible without probable cause or a warrant if
the device was installed at the telephone company
offices. Because there was no invasion of a tradi-
tionally recognized privacy interest, either in in-
stalling a monitoring device in the home or in
listening to the information-in a private telephone
conversation, the majority found no search; that is,
there was no intrusion into a privacy interest pro-
tected by the fourth amendment. Smith appears to
give the government the right to install pen register
devices on the telephone of every person in this
country, since no one has a recognized right of
privacy in the numbers which he dials from his
telephone. Smith falls on the heels of the Court's
decisions holding that there is no fourth amend-
ment interest invaded by a federal law which
requires banks to record detailed information re-
garding their customer accounts and then allows
the government to subpoena and examine the bank
records without identifying a specific set of records
in which it has probable cause to believe there is
evidence of criine.162 It would appear that the
Court's limited fourth amendment approach to
privacy interests may have already given sanction
to the television camera, if not the "beeper," hy-
potheticals. Thus, it is critical that the Court shift
its focus to a due process methodology so that it
does not sanction wholesale invasion of the privacy
of the members of the general public.
The extent of governmental intrusions into the
privacy of individuals that might be justified by a
narrow fourth amendment approach merits some
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
Ib' 99 S. Ct. 2577 (1979).
"-'See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976);
California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
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consideration. Consider the problem presented by
a government agency that bribes or coerces family
members into gathering information about other
members of the family by carrying electronic trans-
mitting devices which record or transmit the sub-
stance of family conversations. Assuming that the
family members find out about the informer, it
appears that they would lose a case challenging the
government's practice under the Court's current
rulings. The first amendment will offer little basis
for challenging the practice unless those monitored
can show that they had some specific injury to
their first amendment associations endangered by
this practice. This seems unlikely if the informing
family member agreed to the practice, thereby
indicating that the first amendment privacy-asso-
ciation interest never really existed. If the govern-
ment is not dispensing the information to other
private persons in a way that severely intrudes
upon the monitored individuals' liberty or property
interests, there is no procedural due process issue.
The Court's rulings in the area of the fourth
amendment might be seen as endorsing such a
practice, even if it is undertaken on a wide scale
without any suspicion that the monitored persons
are engaging in criminal activity.
The last major fourth amendment ruling in this
area was United States v. White,Iss in which the
Court upheld the use of informers carrying con-
cealed transmitting devices on the theory that there
was no intrusion into fourth amendment privacy
interests. Justice Harlan issued a forceful dissent in
White centering not only on the fourth amendment
interest in limiting police intrusions into private
conversations, but also on the need to protect the
freedom of individuals to speak and act without a
fear that will limit their substantive liberty inter-
ests.' Some fourth amendment scholars have
thought the Harlan approach was improper be-
cause of his concern over a first amendment and
due process freedom to act.'6 But a strict fourth
amendment approach would fail to provide any
limit on the wholesale use of informers to gain
information about private citizens in whom the
"a401 U.S. 745 (1971). The White plurality opinion
was written by Justice White and joined by ChiefJustice
Burger, and Justices Stewart and Blackmun. However,
the addition ofJustice Rehnquist to the Court effectively
makes the ruling one of the majority; Mr. Justice Rehn-
quist, in recent terms, has not voted to reverse a criminal
conviction except in those cases where the Justices were
unanimous in such an action.
"' Id. at 768 (llarlan, J., dissenting).
r' Se Grano, supra note 141, at 434.
government had some interest, political or other-
wise. Because the use of the informer, whether with
or without the use of an electronic transmitter, only
verifies the occurrence which the defendant vol-
untarily shared with him, there is no fourth amend-
ment search or seizure in a traditional sense. In
Hoffa v. United States,66 the Court held that an
individual's fourth amendment privacy interests
were not invaded by the use of a government
informant because the informant's activities were
known to that individual, who merely misplaced
his trust in the informer by assuming that the
informer would not convey evidence to the govern-
ment. Under the limited approach of Hoffa and
White, no significant fourth or fifth amendment
interest would be endangered by a government
practice of bribing the spouses or children of an
individual to provide information or to transmit
conversations concerning the individual, who may
or may not be suspected of criminal activity. Of
course, it is hard to believe that the Supreme Court
would permit a practice such as this, but in Hoffa
only Chief Justice Warren took the position that
the principle of fairness in the adversary process
and the need to protect the integrity of the criminal
justice system placed any limit on the government's
ability to procure and use informants. 7' Perhaps
the reader considers this example to be overly
dramatic, but if fourth and fifth amendment anal-
ysis is incapable of resolving a problem so clearly
antithetical to our democratic system, how can it
possibly be useful in resolving lesser intrusions into
the general privacy interest of the public such as
occurred in the "beeper" or television examples?
The danger to privacy presented by generalized
government data collection practices is both pro-
cedural and substantive. It is procedural since it
often relates to investigations which result in pros-
ecution and thereby implicates both fourth amend-
ment interests and the interest of fairness to an
individual in the adversary process. It is also sub-
stantive since the existence of such practices will,
as Justice Harlan incisively noted, affect the ability
of persons to act freely and to rely on their individ-
ual privacy in their day to day lives. In order to
protect these substantive and procedural policy
interests the Court, in data collection cases, must
return to a due process methodology. This ap-
"0'385 U.S. 293 (1966).
" Id. at 313 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). The Chief
Justice based his dissent on the Supreme Court's power
and duty to insure the fair administration of justice in
the federal system.
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proach requires evaluating the procedural privacy
interest reflected in the fourth amendment, the
substantive privacy interest reflected in the first
amendment, and the generalized right of privacy
inherent in the concept of liberty. The Supreme
Court has already recognized a limited substantive
right to privacy based on the value of private
decisionmaking in family-unit decisions: 68 an in-
dividual's freedom to engage in traditional forms
of marriage,' 69 a married couple's decision to use
contraceptives,' 70 and a woman's decision to have
an abortion.' 7 ' It should be easier to justify judicial
examination of the privacy value endangered by
data-collection practices, as the Court can rely on
the fact that the first and fourth amendments
reflect an historic respect for a private individual's
sense of security in being free from governmental
knowledge of his activities. But narrow focus on
the amendments will not resolve these issues; this
privacy interest can be defined and evaluated only
through a due process methodology. This meth-
odology was reflected in the opinion of Justice
Harlan in White:
The critical question, therefore, is whether under
our system of government, as reflected in the Con-
stitution, we should impose on our citizens the risks
of the electronic listener or observer without at least
the protection of a warrant requirement.
This question must, in my view, be answered by
assessing the nature of a particular practice and the
likely extent of its impact on the individual's sense
of security balanced against the utility of the con-
duct as a technique of law enforcement.'
" 8 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925)(freedom to send children to private schools);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)(family and
teacher freedom to teach foreign languages to children in
private schools).
" Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving
v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The right does not appear
to involve a right to disregard traditional government
regulations prohibiting marriages between certain rela-
tives or persons of the same sex. See J. NOWAK, R.
ROTUNDA &J. YOUNG, supra note 16 (Supp. 1979).
" Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1955). The
Court has struck down strict laws prohibiting sales of
contraceptives to unmarried persons, including persons
under 18 years of age, but at the same time has indicated
that it will uphold laws prohibiting sexual activity by
those persons. See Carey v. Population Servs. Interna-
tional, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA &J.
YOUNG, supra note 16 (Supp. 1979).
" Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
''2 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786
(197 1) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court may or may not wish to
formally justify its analysis under the fourth
amendment; what is important is not the verbali-
zation of the basis for the inquiry into the govern-
ment practices, but the use of a due process meth-
odology in Court decisionmaking. Our due process
model would require the Court to evaluate the
philosophic and historic values concerning the pri-
vacy of individual actions and the data concerning
one's life, the extent of the infringement on that
freedom caused by a governmental practice, and
the ability of the government to demonstrate some
need to use the program in order to achieve an
important societal interest. This methodology may
not result in a ruling that adequately protects
privacy interests, but it at least will force the Court
to face the question, as opposed to using a technical
reading of the fourth amendment to avoid the
problem.
There is no doubt that a majority of the current
Justices believe that the exclusionary rules have no
value beyond the possibility of deterring egregious
fourth amendment violations; additionally, they
believe that the exclusion of evidence engenders an
extraordinarily high social cost for an arguably
small amount of deterrence. This attitude is ap-
parent not only in the decisions concerning fifth
and fourth amendment rulings discussed in the
previous two sections of this article, but also in the
exclusion of fourth amendment claims from federal
habeas corpus proceedings.'73 But theJustices must
not allow a dislike of the exclusionary rule to alter
the basic meaning of the fourth and fifth amend-
ments. While this article does not propose to join
the exclusionary rule debate, 74 it must be recog-
nized that it would clearly be better for the Court
to face this question openly rather than to narrowly
define the constitutional value of personal privacy
so as to avoid the impact of the rule.
7
1
DUE PROCESS AND THE REASONABLE DOUBT
STANDARD
Having examined Supreme Court decisions con-
cerning the most litigated provisions of the Bill of
Rights, it is time to examine the Court's use of due
process principles in rendering recent decisions.
Since the area of due process adjudication is too
'73 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
'4 Compare Kamisar, The Exclusionary Rule in Historical
Perspective, 62 JUDICATURE 337 (1979) with Wilkey, A Call
for Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 62 JUDICATURE 351
(1979).175 Kaplan, note 137 supra.
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large to detail in a single article, 76 this analysis
shall focus upon the Court's recent decisions con-
cerning the standards which due process imposes
upon a state's burden of proof in a criminal pros-
ecution.
The development of due process principles re-
garding the reasonable doubt standard has in-
volved a more value-oriented process than was
evidenced in the opinions regarding Bill of Rights
issues which we examined previously. For example,
in Jackson v. Virginia'77 the Court held that, in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding, a state defendant
can always request a determination as to whether
there was sufficient evidence to justify the factfin-
der's verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The majority, in using the due process methodol-
ogy, went from evaluating the practical and his-
toric values underlying the reasonable doubt stan-
dard to evaluating the ability of modern judicial
systems to enforce the reasonable doubt standard
on a case-by-case basis.
Justice Stewart, speaking for the Jackson major-
ity, found the value of the reasonable doubt stan-
dard tied to the fundamental constitutional prin-
ciple that
a person cannot incur the loss of liberty for an
offense without notice and a meaningful opportu-
nity to defend.... A meaningful opportunity to
defend, if not the right to a trial itself, presumes as
well that a total want of evidence to support a
charge will conclude a case in the favor of the
accused.' 78
The Court had utilized this principle to establish
the rule that a conviction can be based only upon
the charge made by the prosecution and upon
which the defendant was tried. Thus, when the
state charges and tries a defendant for a specific
crime, a reviewing court may not uphold the de-
fendant's conviction for an uncharged crime. Even
if the government proved an uncharged crime
beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant's con-
viction on the charged crime must be reversed.
79
The principles of fair notice and opportunity to
defend are basic due process values which also
17'6 The cases touch upon subjects as diverse as death
penalty procedures, physical conditions in prisons, and
procedural rights at parole hearings. See respectively Green
v. Georgia, 99 S. Ct. 2150 (1979) and Presnell v. Georgia,
439 U.S. 14 (1978); Bell v. Wolfish, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979);
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Neb. Penal & Correctional
Complex, 99 S. Ct. 2100 (1979).
1'7 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979).
'
7 Id. at 2786-87.
' Dunn v. United States, 99 S. Ct. 2190 (1979).
apply to the penalty-determination phase of the
criminal process. Thus, during the past Term, the
Court overturned a death s'ntence when the gov-
ernment failed to prove the basis for the death
penalty which it charged, although evidence in the
record supported a different basis for imposing the
death penalty t s" This fair-prosecution principle
underlies the historic commitment to the reasona-
ble doubt standard, and it lead Justice Stewart to
evaluate the functional, as well as the historic,
value of the reasonable doubt standard.
The Jackson majority found that the reasonable
doubt standard serves at least two functions. First,
it gives meaning to the presumption of innocence
and, thereby, protects against errors in the factfin-
der's guilt determination. Second, it symbolizes the
significance of the criminal sanction and the value
that society places on individual liberty.'8' Thus
Justice Stewart's opinion followed the due process
methodology in explaining the functional value of
the standard and its historic value as a part of our
conception of liberty.
Much earlier, in Thompson v. Louisville, 8 the
Court found that when there was no evidence to
support a state conviction, that conviction violated
due process. However, as noted by Justice Stewart,
Thompson addressed only the problem of totally
arbitrary convictions. It would have been dishon-
est, as well as erroneous, to claim that Thompson
resolved the issues regarding the means of enforcing
the reasonable doubt standard through a habeas
corpus proceeding. Consequently, the Jackson Court
found that merely adopting a federal rule that
overturned convictions based upon no evidence of
guilt would not adequately protect the reasonable
doubt standard and the values which it reflected.
Justice Stewart also employed a due process
methodology in considering whether the social cost
of the new procedural safeguard outweighed the
value of rigorously enforcing the due process prin-
ciple. While it was argued that the use of a mean-
ingful standard would both increase the workload
of the federal district courts and create unwar-
ranted tension with state courts, the majority did
not accept either argument. First, the Court felt
that the workload of the federal courts would not
be increased significantly because the written rec-
ord in most cases would disclose whether or not
there was an adequate basis for the verdict and
preclude the need for additional evidentiary hear-
:8, Presnell v. Georgia. 439 U.S. 14 (1978) (per curiam).
ti Jackson v. Virginia, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979).
1"2 362 U.S. 199 (1960).
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ings. Secondly, the problem of federal-state com-
ity was a false one. It is the duty of federal courts
to enforce federal constitutional principles, and the
supremacy clause provides the historic basis for
federal review of state proceedings.' 84 Additionally,
the majority injackson adopted a standard that did
not substitute the judgment of a federal district
judge for that of the judges and factfinders in state
proceedings because the standard is not whether
the federal judge believes that the defendant is
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether the
record discloses evidence upon which a reasonable
factfinder might have found guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt.,8S
Justice Stewart found that the possible costs of
the Jackson ruling did not outweigh the value of
habeas corpus enforcement of this due process prin-
ciple. In so doing, he distinguished Stone v. Powell"
wherein the Court excluded most fourth amend-
ment claims from federal habeas corpus review.
The fourth amendment cases involved situations
where defendants admittedly were guilty and con-
victed upon reliable evidence. So long as the state
gave the individual defendant an opportunity to
contest fourth amendment issues, the principles of
the fourth amendment and the policy of the exclu-
sionary rule were protected by the possibility of
Supreme Court review. In Jackson, the principle to
be enforced was "central to the basic question of
guilt or innocence,"' 87 and the federal due process
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
would be a meaningless safeguard if there was no
system for reviewing the records in these cases.
Given the importance of the due process values at
stake, Justice Stewart correctly found that the
problems of comity should not preclude habeas
corpus relief. Our greatest state judges in recent
years have welcomed federal review of state crimi-
nal proceedings in order to insure that the consti-
tutional rights of defendants are protected.' 88
Related to the definition and enforcement of the
reasonable doubt standard are questions concern-
ing the use of presumptions, and inferences which
have plagued the Court in recent years. In Mullaney
v. Wilbur t8 the Court overturned a Maine statutory
"i' Tackson v. Virginia, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 279! (1979).
""The principle dates back to Cohens v. Virginia. 19
U.S. (6 'Wheat) 264 (1821).
"'Jackson v. Virginia. 99 S. Ct. 2781. 2789 (1979).
" 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
9~ 9 S. Ct. at 2792.
", See R TRAYNOR, THE DEVILS OF Dui PROCESS IN
CRIMINAL )FTE'.roIoN, DETENTION, AND TRIAL (1966).
Scha,fer. supra note 15, at 25-26.
'b" 121 U.S. 684 (1975).
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and common-law rule which required a defendant
charged with murder to prove that he was acting
under the "heat of passion" in order to reduce his
homicide liability to manslaughter. Mullaney
seemed to establish a requirement that the govern-
ment prove every element of a charge and disprove
every affirmative defense beyond a reasonable
doubt.
Patterson . New York' 9° involved a statute which
defined second-degree murder as the intentional
killing of another person but which permitted the
defendant to establish a defense of "extreme emo-
tional disturbance" by a preponderance of the
evidence. New York had retained first-degree mur-
der and the separate manslaughter crime. The
Supreme Court upheld the affirmative defense ele-
ment of the second-degree murder provisions be-
cause the state had created a new class of offense,
with a lesser penalty than first-degree murder,
through an expanded definition of mitigating fac-
tors. The Court would not make the state choose
between requiring that any new mitigating factor
be disproved beyond a reasonable doubt and re-
fusing to recognize the mitigating factor. The state
would have been able to eliminate these defenses
and allow the defendant to be convicted with no
reference to such mitigating factors. Thus it ap-
pears that the Court will allow some shifting of the
burden of proof regarding affirmative defenses
where a statute requires the state to prove the basic
elements of an offense but requires the defendant
to prove the existence of a mitigating factor. So
long as the state does not redefine the traditional
elements of the crime in a manner that either
presumes guilt or subverts the reasonable doubt
standard, it can place this type of affirmative de-
fense burden on the accused.
Patterson may be attacked for failing to require a
procedure where the prosecution must prove every
element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' 9'
Two recent commentators, John Jeffries and Paul
Stephan, have noted that such a strictly procedural
view, which focuses only on the formal burden of
proof, avoids the ultimate questions of substantive
justice and due process.' 92 In an affirmative defense
case, the Court should be concerned with the gov-
ernment's ability to punish someone for a specific
crime, with a designated penalty, while disregard-
usi 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
i For the basis of such an analysis and attack, see
Undcrwood, 7he Thumb on the Scales of justice: Burdens of
Persuaswn in Cnmnal Cases, 86 YALE L.J. 1299 (1977).
'9"Jeffries & Stephan, Defense5, Presumptions, and Burden
of Proof in Ihe Criminal La'. 88 YALE UJ. 1325 (1979).
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ing the accused's mitigatory defense. If it is fair to
punish the defendant even if the defense exists,
then the question of who must establish the affirm-
ative defense is irrelevant. For example, if it is fair
to sentence a defendant to death for killing another
human being, regardless of his mens rea, then it is
unimportant who must prove the state of mind of
the defendant. However, the procedural approach
should not be disregarded, as it may initiate legis-
lative action. The striking of affirmative defenses
on a procedural basis will force the legislature to
reexamine the affirmative defense and to question
whether it wishes to punish persons regardless of
mitigating factors.'" If legislators do not want to
punish someone when there is a likelihood that
mitigating factors exist, they merely will shift the
burden of proof to the prosecutor. If, however, the
legislature seeks to eliminate the affirmative de-
fense, the state's ability to punish the defendant for
the new offense, which does not recognize the
affirmative defense, can be tested under either the
cruel and unusual punishment clause'9 or the due
process clauses. 1
9
When the prosecution seeks to use a mandatory
presumption which only requires the state to estab-
lish an underlying fact, it really is shifting the
burden of proof to.the defendant. A law establish-
ing a mandatory presumption must be tested "on
its face" because it alters the basis for finding a
defendant guilty of a charged crime. Last year the
Supreme Court invalidated a presumption which
established the mental element necessary to sustain
a price-fixing charge upon proof that the defend-
ants exchanged price information. The presump-
tion criminalized the underlying act of exchanging
information except in cases where the defendant
could prove an absence of inculpating motives.'9
During the past Term, in Sandstrom v. Montlana,'
97
the Court invalidated the use of a jury instruction
in homicide cases which stated that "the law pre-
sumes that every person intends the ordinary con-
sequences of his voluntary act." In Sandstrom the
u"",See Underwood, note 191 supra.
" This change might be used, in theory, to test the
relation of the sentence to the offense although the Su-
preme Court has not often indicated that it would review
sentelices on this basis. See Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349 (1909). See also Badders v. United States, 240
U.S. 391 (1918).
I - This due process/substantive justice test is the es-
sence of the Jeffries-Stephan analysis of burden shifting
defenses. See Jeffries & Stephan, note 192 supra.
"' United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438
U.S. 422, 435 (1978).
'97 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979).
defendant admitted killing another person, but
contended that he was unable to form the intent
required for the statutory offense of "deliberate
homicide." Conviction under the statute required
the state to prove that the defendant acted pur-
posely or knowingly in causing the victim's death.
The majority viewed the instruction as requiring
the jury to find that the defendant was guilty
unless the defendant could prove that he did not
have the requisite mental state. Consequently, the
statute created a mandatory presumption which
shifted the burden of proving an essential element
of the crime to the defendant.
The majority opinion in Sandstrom, by Mr.Justice
Brennan, noted that the threshold inquiry was
whether the instruction involved a mandatory pre-
sumption or a permissible inference. A mandatory
presumption concerning a traditional element of
an offense will be invalid unless tse existence of the
proved fact (i.e., the killing in Sandstrom) leads a
factfinder to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the presumed fact (the mens rea) also existed.
Without rigorous application of the reasonable
doubt standard to the mandatory presumption, the
role of the factfinder would be undercut because
the factfinder would not be free to determine
whether the ultimate fact existed.
The use of inferences, sometimes called permis-
sive presumpt ions, presents different questions than
does the use of mandatory presumptions or affirm-
ative defenses.ss The factfinder's use of an infer-
ence merely recognizes that some facts can be
proved without direct evidence. An inference al-
lows the factfinder to conclude that the inferred
fact exists based upon the proof of related facts or
conditions. A jury instruction employing only an
inference or permissive presumption informs the
jurors that they may find that the presumed fact
was established by another proven fact. If the
instruction indicates that the jury must find the
presumed facts from the proved fact it is a man-
datory presumption that must be tested by the
reasonable doubt standard because it eliminates
the jury's judgment on the ultimate fact and allows
punishment on the basis of the proved fact alone.
Where the presumption or inference is truly per-
missive there is no reason to examine the presump-
tion to determine if it meets the reasonable doubt
standard as a hypothetical matter for all cases.
With inferences, the relevant issue is whether the
19 The nature of these inferences and presumptions is
explained and analyzed in Nesson, Reasonable Doubt and
Penniuire Inferences: The Value of Complerit, 92 1 1ARV. L.
Rvv. 1187 t1979).
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record in the particular case would allow a reason-
able finder of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that the state had established all elements of
the offense. In other words, the question is whether
it would have been reasonable for the jury to infer
guilt based upon the indirect or circumstantial
evidence presented at a trial.
During the past Term the Supreme Court
adopted this analysis in County Court v. Allen.' The
Court upheld the conviction of three adult males
charged with illegal possession of guns when those
guns were, in fact, in the open handbag of a minor
female passenger riding in a car with them. The
trial court instructed the jurors that they could
employ a statutory presumption that all persons
riding in a vehicle possessed any handguns con-
tained in the passenger area of the vehicle. A
majority of the Justices found that the instructions
did not establish a mandatory presumption which
would have shifted the burden of proof regarding
the issue of possession to the defendants. Instead,
the Court viewed this instruction as merely inform-
ing thejury of a permissible inference which would
allow them to return a verdict of guilty if the jurors
believed that the defendants were in possession of
the guns. There is nothing objectionable about the
inference if the instructions in County Court are
understood as only informing the jurors that they
need not acquit a defendant because the guns were
not on the person of the defendant.
In prior cases the Court failed to explain whether
an inference had to meet the reasonable doubt
test.200 In County Court the Court addressed this
issue. The majority found that a permissive pre-
sumption should not be tested on its face; that is,
the relationship between the proven fact and the
presumed fact need not be one that is always true
beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, the relation-
ship need not always be reasonable. Because the
inference allows the jury to reach an independent
conclusion on the presumed fact in the individual
case rather than eliminating the state's burden of
proof in an element of the crime, the issue to be
resolved is whether the jury could have found the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in
light of the proven fact and all other facts presented
at trial. In County Court the majority found that a
jury could have concluded, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the defendants possessed the handguns.
The Supreme Court's approach is reasonable so
."999 S. Ct. 2213 (1979).
="'See Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 843
(1973).
long as it is clear that the instructions left the jury
free to determine whether or not they should give
any weight to the circumstantial evidence and to
the inference. Unfortunately, the Court did not
enunciate a rule for differentiating permissive and
mandatory presumptions. Consequently, the
threshold inquiry referred to in Sandstrom will re-
main a difficult one.
The Court should have followed the advice of
Professor Nesson and required that jury instruc-
tions on permissible inferences state the possible
inference, that the defendant is presumed innocent,
and that the jury is not free to find guilt solely
upon the existence of the proved fact. 2°' Such a
rule would require the state to differentiate infer-
ences from mandatory presumptions more clearly,
and thereby insure the factfinder is free to reach
an independent judgment in inference cases.
During the past two Terms the Court also has
considered the value of a presumption of innocence
instruction in protecting the reasonable doubt stan-
dard. In Taylor v. Kentucky' the Court invalidated
a conviction because the trial judge had refused to
instruct the jury on the presumption of the defend-
ant's innocence. The majority opinion recognized
that the presumption of innocence is not a true
presumption; it is really a means of describing the
basic principle of the reasonable doubt standard:
that the state either must prove the defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt or free the de-
fendant as "innocent." The rationale of Taylor
indicated that the presumption of innocence in-
struction was necessary to protect the reasonable
doubt standard, but the majority opinion stated
only that the instruction was necessary in the par-
ticular case to insure that the state proved the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
During the past Term, in Kentucky v. Whorton,
"
the Court held that the presence or absence of such
an instruction was only one factor to consider in
determining whether a particular defendant re-
ceived a constitutionally fair trial. In Whorton the
majority found that the constitutional values of a
fair trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt
required a case-by-case analysis rather than a per
se rule requiring a presumption of innocence in-
struction in all cases. Justice Stewart, who had
written the opinion in Taylor, dissented in Whorton.
He argued that the presumption of innocence in-
struction was a vital component of the reasonable
2o) Nesson, supra note 198, at 1215, 1222-25.
"2 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
2 99 S. Ct. 2088 (1979).
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doubt standard.2°4 This mirrored his analysis in
Jackson, where he examined the functional and
historic values of the reasonable doubt standard. 2°5
Although the Whorton majority did not engage
in open use of a due process methodology in re-
jecting Justice Stewart's position, the Whorton rul-
ing may be rationalized in light of the affirmative
defense and presumption cases. The constitution-
ally required standard of proof beyond a reasona-
ble doubt has a functional value in aiding an
accurate guilt determination as well as an historic,
philosophic value related to our societal conception
of liberty. Any formal shifting of the burden of
proof to the defendant must relate to an item not
traditionally part of the charged crime. This prin-
ciple enforces the reasonable doubt standard as to
the charged crime and requires the legislature to
face openly the question of whether it wishes to
punish the defendant for a different form of offense.
When the state seeks to use a mandatory presump-
tion regarding a traditional element of an offense,
the state must establish the presumed fact beyond
a reasonable doubt; this is necessary to avoid un-
dercutting the jury's function of independently
applying the reasonable doubt standard to all ele-
ments of the alleged offense. When the state seeks
to use an inference, all of the factors in the case
must be considered to determine if the reasonable
doubt standard was met. When all the instructions
and the burden-allocating devices require the state
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and
require the jury to consider the evidence indepen-
dently, the additional presumption of innocence
instruction may be superfluous. When the factfin-
der's other instructions or guidelines are unclear,
the presumption of innocence instruction may be
2" Id. at 2090 (Stewart, J., joined by Brennan and
Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
2 5 See notes 177-88 and accompanying text supra.
critical to insuring that the reasonable doubt stan-
dard was met.
CONCLUSION
In examining the Court's recent decisions re-
garding the reasonable doubt standard, we have
seen that the Court has come much closer to using
a due process methodology in this area than in its
Bill of Rights decisions. When openly examining
questions of due process, the Court has inquired
into the functional and historic values reflected in
the concepts of liberty and due process. This ap-
proach is in stark contrast to the Bill of Rights
decisions wherein the Court's opinions fail to ex-
plore the nature of the values at stake in the
proceedings while manifesting a disregard for the
basic due process values of individual dignity,
equality, and fairness. At the end of each Term it
may often appear that the results of the cases are
the most important aspect of the Court's work.
However, it is the decisionmaking process, as re-
flected in the opinions of the Court that is most
important. While today's rulings may be limited
or overturned tomorrow, if the Court indicates that
it will form constitutional rules based on fiat rather
than on reason, its authority inevitably will be
called into quest ion."° 6 Adoption of the due process
methodology model for decisions in both due proc-
ess and Bill of Rights cases would focus the Court's
attention, in all criminal procedure decisions, on
its basic function of defining constitutional values.
The Court's ability to define and fulfill an, inde-
pendent judicial role in the criminal procedure
decisions of the 1980's may depend on its ability to
adapt Dean Kadish's due process model to these
postincorporation problems.
2 0 7
206 See generally E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
REASONING (1949); Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59
HARV. L. REv. 376 (1946).
27 Kadish, note 18 supra.
